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This article argues two related propositions. First, if Congress
were to eliminate all funding for lower federal courts, its
constitutional authority to regulate those courts would become as
meaningless as the empty courthouses. Second, Congress breaches
its duty to furnish a forum at a point short of full de funding, and with
that breach, Congress's regulatory power over private civil disputes
otherwise litigable in state courts-preempted and removable state
law claims-becomes constitutionally invalid. The first fact setting
of full defunding is hypothetical; the second has been underway for
several years.
I.

THE DEFUNDING OF FEDERAL COURTS

For the past two decades, Congress has undermined the
operation of federal courts with a combination of inadequate budget
increases and remarkable expansions of federal jurisdiction. As
explained in the following section, the budget shortfalls are greater
than apparent on the face of the budget because of the unique,
constitutionally-mandated allocation of fixed costs and so-called
discretionary operating costs within the federal judiciary.
A.

The JudicialBudget

Federal courts are in an unprecedented funding crisis for
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which there is, as of now, no end in sight and no plausible solution.
Funding shortages are not new to the judiciary-Congress shortfunded the jury allocation in 1986,' and even declined funds for
purely political reasons in its 1802 attempt to unseat Federalist
judges appointed by President Adams.2 But the current crisis, now
several years underway, is of a magnitude that if unchecked may
well redistribute the power balance among the government's three
branches. The judiciary's most recent and most pointed response is
Chief Justice Rehnquist's commissioning of a study that resulted in
the Cost-Containment Strategy for the Federal Judiciary: 2005 and
Beyond, 3 a report that both quantifies and places in context the
judiciary's crisis and provides a number of good faith contingency
plans to deal with deteriorating support.
Tight funding from a tax-cutting Congress is not the only
problem. The fact of lagging funds is aggravated by the judiciary's
unique distinction between mandatory or fixed costs and
"discretionary" costs. Examples of fixed costs are salaries for judges
and their immediate staffs (secretaries and judicial clerks) and rent
paid to the General Services Administration. All other expenses are
discretionary-these include the salaries for all other employees
(district clerks and their staffs, probation
office, federal public
4
defender), and the purchase of equipment.
1. See Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1430 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that the "civil trial system may not be suspended for lack of
funds."); see also James T. Brennan, Judicial FiscalIndependence, 23 U. FLA. L.
REv. 277, 279 (1971) (noting earlier funding shortages, particularly in state
courts); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Comment, Court Finance and Unitary
Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286 (1972) (same); Jonathan Bunge, Congressional
Underappropriationfor Civil Juries:Responding to the Attack on a Constitutional
Guarantee,55 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 238 n.3 (1988) (same).
2. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (stating that the newlyappointed judges sued to compel funding, but the opinion skirts their argument);
UNITED STATES CONST. ANNOT., 600 (J. Killian & G. Costello, eds., 1992) (citing
W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 58-78 (1918)).
3. Cost-Containment Strategy for the Federal Judiciary: 2005 and Beyond
(Aug. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Cost-ContainmentReport] (unpublished report, App.
F to the Report of the Executive Committee, Judicial Conference of the United
States, approved on Sept. 21, 2004) (on file with author). Although the Report is
not publicly available, the proceedings approving the Report are available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sep04proc.pdf.
4. Cost-Containment Report, supra note 3, at 6 ("Under statute, only pay
and benefits for Article III judges and bankruptcy judges are considered
'mandatory' requirements. In determining how to spend available funds, however,
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Recent judicial budgets have been flat or modestly
increased, 5 with Congress justifying its denials of needed new funds
as the result of lean times for all government departments. 6 But the
problem is growing worse more quickly than we might speculate
from these modest budget increases. Fixed costs have risen at a far
greater rate than the annual percentage increases, leaving a
dwindling allotment for the so-called discretionary costs. 7 In
describing these allocations, it is important to understand that the
term "discretionary" does not mean that these services can be
eliminated; rather, it means the local district has discretion to
allocate this money depending on local needs, while the local district
does not have discretion in paying judicial salaries or rent to the
Government Services Administration. The mandatory or fixed
expenses will increasingly eat up the federal court budget while
essential employees are terminated and essential court services cut.
Within these fixed expenses, two components must be
distinguished-judicial salaries and rent. Judges' salaries account
for nine percent of the total budget, and studies show they are
additional areas customarily have been set apart by the Executive Committee for
full funding without cutbacks, including magistrate judgeships, chambers staff
costs, certain law enforcement-related costs, lawbooks and computer-assisted legal
research, and space rental payments. Most of these costs have been deemed
'uncontrollable' in the short term. To attain a balanced financial plan, the
committee restricts spending in other areas that are considered discretionary. These
discretionary categories include non-chambers staffing, general operating costs,
and technology. These expenditures largely fund the court units--clerks' offices,
probation and pretrial services, circuit executives, staff attorneys, and other
support functions.").
5. Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at i ("On top of the last two years
of inadequate funding, the judiciary confronts the prospect of larger shortfalls over
the next several years. Estimates of probable funding levels, when compared with
budget requirements based on current policies and practices, indicate that a
growing gap of hundreds of millions of dollars will materialize over the next five
years-putting thousands of court jobs at risk."); id.at 3 ("In past years, Congress
provided less funding than requested, with the percentage increases declining each
year for the past five years.").
6. Michael McGough, Judiciary Faces Fight for Federal Funding,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 25, 2004, at A16 (quoting Senator Arlen
Specter: "'We're coming out of a recession, we're at war, and we have a big
deficit,' Specter said. 'I'm prepared to listen [to the judges], but it's a matter of
comparing them to other departments whose problems are more acute. This is an
era of belt-tightening."'). But see infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text
(suggesting a less neutral motive).
7. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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5

significantly underpaid. 8 Rent is the other major fixed-cost
component. That federal courts even pay rent will be a surprise to
most lawyers, but they do.
The Government Services
Administration, that is, the executive branch, "owns" the buildings
housing the federal courts. The GSA sets the rental rate and does so
according to its own formula, 9 and as a result, rent has been the

largest percentage of budget growth.' 0 The resulting irony is that
our federal courts are
ourselves too much rent.
any given administration
the GSA's ability to set
separation of powers. 1

compromised because we are charging
To the extent that the executive branch in
chooses to pursue an anti-judicial agenda,
its rental rates would seem to undermine

8. Am. Bar Ass'n & Fed. Bar Ass'n, Federal Judicial Pay Erosion: A
Report on the Need for Reform 8-18 (2001), http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/fedjudreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2005); see also Adjusting the
Compensation of FederalJudges, 80 JUDICATURE 248 (1997) (reporting that since
1993 judicial salaries have declined 12.2 percent in real dollars); Economic
Independence for FederalJudges, 84 JUDICATURE 56 (2000) (advocating higher
judicial pay).
9. 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 584-86 (West 2005); 41 C.F.R. § 102-85.15 (2005).
10. Cost-Containment Report, supra note 3, at 2 ("The judiciary's overall
annual budget needs are driven by the cost increases necessary to continue current
operations, and by increases associated with growth in workload, judges, staff and
space. Cost increases in the two primary spending areas, i.e., personnel and rent,
have significantly outpaced inflation. Rent costs have grown at a faster pace than
personnel costs").
11. On April 13, 2005-late in this article's writing-the Judicial Conference
of the United States issued a memorandum complaining again of the GSA's rent
structure. The memo included the points that: (1) the GSA has discretion under
Title 40 U.S.C. § 581 "to exempt federal entities in GSA controlled space from
rental payments"; (2) budget shortages required the judicial branch to cut eight
percent of its total staff (1,790 positions) in fiscal year 2004 and early fiscal year
2005, cuts far more drastic than any other federal department or agency had to
make; (3) "even though the judiciary receives only two-tenths of one percent of the
federal budget," it pays "more in rent in total dollars than any other department or
agency in the federal government," including the Defense Department, except for
the Department of Justice which pays three percent of its larger budget in rent,
compared to the judiciary's payment of twenty-two percent of its budget; (4) many
federal agencies pay no rent at all on their government-owned facilities; (5)
overall, federal agencies pay an average of 0.19 percent of their budgets in rent,
and Congress pays 0.56 percent of its budget, while the judiciary pays twenty-two
percent of its budget in rent, that is, the judiciary pays 116 times more in rent, as a
percentage of budget, than the executive branch and thirty-nine times more than
Congress; (6) the judiciary's rent has increased from $133 million in 1986 to its
current $923 million; (7) with scheduled increases, the judiciary will have to lay
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In 2004, fifty-nine percent of the federal judicial budget went2
to fixed costs and forty-one percent to discretionary costs.'
Assuming Congress continues in this budget pattern, the Cost
Containment Report projects that fixed costs will require seventytwo percent of the budget by 2009, leaving only twenty-eight percent
to cover the discretionary costs.' 3 As noted above, discretionary
costs may be erroneously viewed as unnecessary. The largest
component is salaries for personnel outside the judges' chamberscourt clerks, public defenders, probationary staffs, and so on. But
the federal courts are not overstocked with employees. In light of
the federal docket's enormous growth, 14 it is significant to note that
"[o]ver the past 10 years, the square footage occupied by the
judiciary has doubled while personnel has grown by 23 percent...
This disparity has put the judiciary behind and must be
,15
addressed in the next few years.
Personnel costs will grow by $953 million and
staffing by about 5,000 over the next five years.
Slightly less than two-thirds of this amount is
attributable to normal pay cost increases for existing
staff. The remaining one-third is driven by application
of the judiciary's current work measurement formulas
that would, if fully funded, restore clerks and
probation and pretrial services staffing levels to full
formula, provide staff for new senior and magistrate
judges, and provide additional staff to clerks and
off a thousand employees a year to pay its rent, which will imperil the survival of
the federal court system; (8) while many federal departments pay no rent or little
rent, the GSA requires the federal courts to pay rent that includes the recovery of
capital costs on buildings that have been fully amortized, not once but many times
over; (9) the GSA uses this windfall (termed "confiscatory rent") to pay its toplevel employees $46,000 more a year than any justice or member of Congress.
The memorandum concluded with a demand that the GSA Administrator and the
Office of Management and Budget provide rent relief for the courts.
Memorandum from Judicial Conference of the United States, Major Rent Charges
and Increases Imposed by GSA Are the Principal Factors in the Judiciary's
Continuing Fiscal Crisis (Apr. 13, 2005) (on file with the author).
12. Cost-ContainmentReport, supranote 3, at 6, 7.
13. Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at 7.
14. See infra Part I.B (describing how the growing economy and Congress's
expansion of federal jurisdiction has increased the size of the federal docket).
15. Cost-ContainmentReport, supranote 3, at ii.
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probation and pretrial services offices to address
future work load growth. 16
According to the Cost-Containment Report, Congress and the
President are unlikely to fund at anywhere near those levels. 17 The
problem is exacerbated because the fat, if there ever was any, has
already been cut, 18 and the budget-starved judicial system is now
eating away at its muscle: "when faced with a very contracted budget
in FY 2004, and the threat of a hard freeze in FY 2005, courts were
compelled to reduce their work force nationwide by 1,350 positions,

16. Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at iv.
17. Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at 4 ("Even the most optimistic
projections indicate that future budget increases will fall well below defined
funding requirements to operate the federal courts. It is unlikely that the judiciary
will obtain double-digit percentage funding increases in the coming years, which is
what would be needed to support the forecasted budget requirements. For fiscal
year 2005, the judiciary needs an increase of over six percent simply to maintain
current staff and services, and an eleven percent increase to fund fully its
requirements using current methodologies.").
18. The Cost-ContainmentReport explains that:
Until recently, most court managers could manage their workforce
and meet operational needs within their allotted funds without severe
consequences. That scenario has changed. Over the last two years, court
allotments have been reduced well below the amounts required by the
applicable funding formulas. In 2004, some court units, including offices
with growing caseloads, received less funding in total than the amount
needed simply to continue to pay existing staff salaries. To get by,
managers are freezing promotions, instituting furloughs, offering early
retirements and buyouts, and laying off staff.
In recent years, as budget growth slowed, the easier reductions have
been made. Managers across the judiciary have adjusted their operations
and staff to live within budget constraints. In the near future, much
tougher decisions will be needed. Following historical practices,
resulting cutbacks in budget allotments to the courts couldfar exceed the
ability of individual courts to absorb without severe consequences for the
administration of justice. Because of the expected growth in the
categories of spending that have been deemed uncontrollable, thousands
of court staff positions could be lost over the next several years.
Supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis added); see also David Shepardson, Federal Court
Cuts Hurt Michigan, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 31, 2004, at Al (quoting Chief U.S.
District Judge Bernard Friedman as stating, "We have cut to the bone. There's no
fat left.").
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or six percent." 19
These data are not mere statistical reports but have been
making local news, though interestingly with little coverage in
nationally-circulated daily newspapers. 2U In 2004, the Detroit News
reported that "Federal Court Cuts Hurt Michigan," explaining that,
"Budget constraints have forced the U.S. District Court in Detroit to
cut back on drug treatment for former inmates, grant dozens of
convicts early release from probation and increase caseloads for
probations officers." 21 The story reported that Detroit, having the
eighth largest caseload in the United States with over 5,000 annual
filings, would reduce its workforce twelve
percent by the end of
22
cuts.
budget
further
no
2004, even with
More dramatically, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that
federal courts in the Southern District of Illinois, already eleven
percent below the prescribed staffing formula, were prepared to close
one day a week in the face of budget cuts. 23 The Pittsburgh PostGazette reported devastating consequences to the federal court
system nationwide with a potential of a twenty percent layoff of
clerks, probation officers and public defenders, quoting Judge John
Heyburn II, budget chair of the Judicial Conference, that "[tlhe
federal judiciary is at a crisis point., 24 The Recorder-a San
Francisco legal newspaper-reported that "[e]arlier this year, the
Northern District's pretrial services office couldn't cover its phone
bill," and explained how the court personnel were using their own
cell phones instead.25 In 2003, the Philadephia Inquirer reported that
"[f]ederal judges in New Jersey are scrambling to cut costs after
19. Where the Money Goes: A Look at How the Judiciary'sFY 2005 Budget

Is Divided, 37 THIRD BRANCH, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (Feb.
2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb05ttb/budget.
20. Late in this article's writing, the following stories appeared, trailing two
years of reporting in regional and local newspapers: Peter Wallsten, Two
Evangelicals Want to Strip Courts'Funds,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A22; Ron
Chernow, Chopping Off the Weakest Branch, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2005, at A27;
Mike Allen, GOP Seeks More Curbs on Courts, WASHINGTON POST, May 12,
2005, at A03.
21. Shepardson, supra note 18, at Al.
22. Shepardson, supra note 18, at Al.
23. Michael Shaw, Southern Illinois U.S. Courts May Go to 4-Day
Workweek, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 2004, at C1.
24. McGough, supra note 6, at A16.
25. Jeff Chorney, Cuts Leave Court Services in Limbo, THE RECORDER, Aug.
9, 2004, at 1.
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learning that their court system is expected to run out of money to
pay jurors on civil trials before the fiscal year ends. ' 26 Reporting the
same story, the New Jersey Record quoted Boston Judge William
stating that this is
Young, another Judicial Conference member, as 27
"government not working in the very basic ways."
The Third Branch Newsletter provides the most thorough
explanation of the crisis, quoting from the Judicial Conference
Budget Committee chair's testimony before Congress and various
interviews. The headline best illustrates the problem: "As Workload
and Resources Head in Opposite Directions, Crisis Looms for
Federal Courts." 28 But Legal Times offers the best opening
summary: "Closing the federal courthouse one day a week. Putting
civil trials on hold for a month. Granting felony offenders early
Deferring payments to court-appointed attorneys.
release.
Curtailing drug treatment. And firing staff., 29 That story goes on to
report that federal courts in the District of Columbia, like those in the
Southern District of Illinois, were contemplating one-day-a-week
closings in the face of a criminal trial docket that had doubled in one
year coupled with a five-percent decreased budget over the same
period. 30 The Eastern District of Virginia, the story continued, faced
similar budget cuts while taking on some of the largest of the
terrorist cases.
For example, the case against Zacarias Moussaoui, the
alleged "20th hijacker," has generated more than 1,175 court filings.
Every one of those must be handled, not only by the judge and her
staff, but also by the clerk's office. "A complicated case like this is a
drain on resources even in the best of years . .. "31
26. Federal Courts Struggle to Stretch Their Budgets, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Dec. 29, 2003, at B5; see also Kate Coscarelli, Feds Try to Avoid JurorPay Shortfall, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 25, 2003, at 47 (stating that federal
judges are tightening their belts to avoid juror-pay shortfall).
27. Money to Pay Federal Jurors Running Low; Crunch May Jeopardize
Civil Trials in NJ. in Fiscal Year, THE RECORD, Dec. 28, 2003, at A3.

28. As Workload and Resources Head in Opposite Directions, Crisis Looms
in Federal Courts, 36 THIRD BRANCH, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 3

(Mar. 2004), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar04ttb/crisis/.
29. Tom Schoenberg, Budget Crisis Looms for D.C. 's FederalCourt, LEGAL
TIMES, June 28, 2004, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also Bruce Moyer, FBA Urges Court Funding Relief, 51 FED.
LAWYER 10 (Oct. 2004) (noting that workloads of federal courts are increasing
while budgets and resources are decreasing).
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Some may argue that these budget reductions are simply
good business practice in tight budget times, and that as long as the
judges preside, justice will be forthcoming in spite of greatly reduced
staffing.
The Cost-Containment Report makes contrary
32
projections,
and lawyers who depend on these essential court
personnel require no proof of their role and value. Moreover, the
notion that Congress is simply tightening its spending is contradicted
by its leaders. In his retreat from comments deemed threatening to
federal judges in regard to the Terry Schiavo case, House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay clarified that his plans were entirely within the
law: "The legislative branch has certain responsibilities and
obligations given to us by the Constitution. We set the jurisdiction
of the courts. We set up the courts. We can unset the courts. We
have the power of the purse. We have oversight of how we spend
their money." 33 On March 17, 2005, DeLay and Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist met privately with evangelical leaders to discuss
ideas for reining in federal judges. One idea discussed in detail there
was "using legislative tactics to withhold money from courts." 34 The
Washington Post reported a few weeks later that "House Republican
leaders plan to use budgetary, oversight and disciplinary authority to
assert greater
control over the federal courts before next year's
35
elections."
B.

The Collision of Reduced Funding and Expanded
Jurisdiction

Against this backdrop of severe funding cuts, consider
Congress's phenomenal expansion of federal jurisdiction over the
past three decades.

32. See Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at 4 (predicting "significant
impairment ofjudicial branch operations").
33. Rick Klein, DeLay Apologizes for Blaming Federal Judges in Schiavo
Case But House Leader Calls for Probe of Judicial Activism, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 14, 2005, at A9.
34. Wallsten, supra note 20, at A22.
35. Allen, supra note 20, at A3.
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1.

Congressional Power over Federal Court
Jurisdiction

The Constitution mandates the creation of a federal court
system as one of three branches of a limited national government, the
apex of a federal system in which states exercise more general
governmental power and retain all authority not constitutionally
designated for the national government. 36 The United States
Constitution designed an interdependent system of three
governmental branches whose functions are fairly distinct, but whose
powers are interdependent in a checks-and-balances system designed
to curtail power abuses by any branch. As a result, the judicial
function is focused in one branch but the judicial power is spread
among all three branches.
This distribution of power is
accomplished in three power dynamics, that is, instances of the
judicial branch having its control over a specific function checked by
one or both other branches. The first two power dynamics are well
known; the third has been obscure but that may change.
The first judicial power dynamic is judicial selection, tenure
and autonomy. Justices and judges appointed under Article III have
lifetime tenure during good behavior, and salary 7Protection to help
insulate them from political and social pressure, but must first be
nominated by the president and then subjected to Senate
confirmation or rejection. 38
The second judicial power dynamic is federal subject matter
jurisdiction-the Constitution provides only an interstitial sketch of
the federal judiciary's limited jurisdiction and authorizes Congress to
fill in the gaps by shaping Article III's boundaries as times and
circumstances require. Congress has done this by giving further
definition to federal questions and diversity claims, and acting on the
implied boundaries of Article III by authorizing the joinder of related
non-federal claims and the removal of cases from state courts.3 9 In
36. U.S. CONST., amend. X. See generally KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87-90 (15th ed. 2004) (summarizing the
structure of the constitutional arrangement); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY
KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1, 7 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the
historical bases of the federal courts and the limits on their jurisdiction).
37. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
38. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at §§ 17-22(A) (stating
that the further definition of federal question jurisdiction is subject to Congress's
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turn, the federal judiciary regulates its own subject matter
jurisdiction with two doctrines: the first is justiciability, focusing on
the appropriateness of claims and claimants before the court,40 and
the second is judicial review, allowing courts to test the
constitutionality of Congress's actions. 4 1 Although the courts have
used their powers since at least Marbury v. Madison42 in 1803,
Congress's broad power to define federal judicial jurisdiction was
little used until Franklin Roosevelt's administration, although the
New Deal's expansion of federal power has not abated under other
later, and more politically-conservative, administrations.
A third judicial power dynamic-untested up to nowconcerns the federal judiciary's budget, which is controlled by
Congress, subject to presidential veto, and not generally subject to
judicial review. 44 But the court does have a check on severe
Article I powers of prescriptive jurisdiction). For the joinder of claims not
qualifying as federal questions or diversity claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993)
(governing joinder of supplemental claims, that is, those forming a part of the
same case or controversy as federal question or diversity claims); see also id. at §
1441(c) (governing removal of separate and independent claims from state to
federal court). See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at §§ 9, 19 (relating
the history of ancillary jurisdiction and pendent claims in federal supplemental
jurisdiction). For removal jurisdiction, see generally 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441-52
(West 1994 & Supp. 2004), and WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at §§ 38-41
(describing the scope, history, and procedure for removal to federal court and
describing the remand process after removal).
40. See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at §§ 12-14 (discussing
the constitutional mandates governing the nature of claims in federal courts, the
necessary standing of the litigants, and whether federal courts may decide political
questions).

41. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 3-31 (summarizing
Marbury v. Madison and the history of judicial review); WRIGHT & KANE, supra
note 36, at 61-62 (linking judicial review to justiciability).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See infra notes 110, 168-226 and
accompanying text.
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (defining Congress's budget power); id. at art.
I, § 7, cl. 3 (defining presidential veto power).
44. Under the justiciability doctrine of standing, federal courts have a limited
power to adjudicate claims by federal taxpayers challenging congressional actions
under the Taxing-and-Spending Clause, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968),
and possibly under the Establishment-of-Religion Clause. Id. at 115 (Fortas, J.
concurring); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (denying taxpayer standing to
parties challenging the Executive branch's transfer of property to a parochial
school); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (denying taxpayer
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underfunding that impairs vital court functions. As explained below,
it is the power under the Due Process and other constitutional clauses
to bar certain categories of claims-those forcing plaintiffs out of
state courts and into federal courts-under the principle that the
federal government has breached its duty to provide a forum. This is
explained in this article's third section, following the discussion of
the courts' expanded docket and the ancient common law duty to
provide access to court.
2.

Expanding Categories of Federal Jurisdiction

At the same moment Congress is stripping funds from the
federal courts, it is loading them up with new cases and new
categories of cases. Supersizing has caught on in Congress's
authorization of federal regulatory power and judicial jurisdiction,
and in some areas the two expansions are not correlative. In addition
to the astonishing growth of federal criminal jurisdiction,45 Congress
has expanded civil jurisdiction in recent years in two broad
categories: first, by the preemption of private law issues formerly
governed by state law, and second, by expanded use of minimal
diversity jurisdiction to federalize additional state-law claims not
otherwise regulated by Congress.
a.

Preemption

Federal regulation of specific legal issues has always been
thought necessary for the smooth workings of a federal system, just
as a limited scope of federal encroachment has been thought, at least
historically, to maintain an important decentralization of power on a
range of issues, and a proper balance between the state and federal
systems. These federalized legal issues are an exercise of both
Congress's Article I powers to regulate matters such as interstate and
foreign commerce, and of its Article III power to define federal
standing and citizen standing to party seeking access to CIA's budget on the basis
of the Accounts Clause). To the extent these precedents allow an action regarding
Congress's court budget cuts, proper plaintiffs would be parties aggrieved as
litigants in other federal cases, and who might have to show an ongoing injury
rather than a one-time lack of access to court.
45. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text (discussing increases in the
federal docket).
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questions for public and private legal disputes. Of course, the two
are not always exercised together-Congress may choose to regulate
an Article I matter and leave enforcement to the federal agencies
without creating a private remedy (although the object of the
enforcement would almost always have the right to a federal forum
to review the agency's action).46
Congress has increasingly chosen to add the private remedy,
and two examples in the past few decades are the federalization of
fraud claims in many private actions (RICO claims) 47 , and of
contract suits for employee benefits (ERISA claims).48
The
Administrative Office began tracking both claims in fiscal year 1991,
when there were 972 RICO claims and 9,843 ERISA claims. 49 In
fiscal year 2004, the RICO claims dropped slightly to 777 while the
ERISA claims rose to 11,421.50 These are only two of many
examples in the growing federalization of private remedies formerly
governed by state law, and another set of numbers demonstrate the
significance of that growth. In fiscal year 1977, federal question
jurisdiction in private disputes, excluding disputes in which the
United States is a party, accounted for 58,083 cases, or sixty-four
percent of the private civil docket, while diversity cases in that year
accounted for 31,735 cases, or thirty-five percent of the private civil
docket.51 In fiscal year 2004, there were 165,241 federal question
claims in private disputes, or seventy-one percent of the private civil
46. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986)
(holding that Ohio's incorporation of federal drug-labeling standards into state law
did not create a federal question in the absence of congressional intent to create a
private remedy).
47. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1961-68 (West 2000) (defining private remedy for fraud).
48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1001-1461 (West 1999 & Supp. I 2004). The private remedy is authorized under
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132, with federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction. Id. §
1131(e).
49. U.S. District Courts: Civil Cases Filed by Nature of Suit, tbl.2.2 (2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.02.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,

2005).
50. Id.
51. U.S. District Courts: Civil Cases Filed by Jurisdiction, tbl.2.1 (2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.01.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2005) [hereinafter Table 2.1] (stating that the private civil docket includes both
numbers listed for private federal question and diversity claims, and local
jurisdiction claims, but not public disputes in which the United States is a party).
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docket, and 67,624 diversity claims, or twenty-nine percent of the
civil docket. 52 Put another way, between fiscal years 1977 and 2004,
federal question claims in private disputes grew 284% and diversity
claims grew 213%.
In addition to these former state law claims now crowding the
federal docket, there is an important distinction between the RICO
and ERISA claims. For RICO, the federal remedy creates concurrent
jurisdiction for federal and state courts, and more important, does not
preempt a state law fraud claim or the access to state courts for those
disputes.53 Plaintiffs bringing a RICO claim may choose between
filing in state or federal court, but in choosing state court, face
removal to federal court if all defendants elect to do so. Plaintiffs
wanting to avoid federal court have a further choice and that is to
avoid pleading the RICO claim, thus limiting the fraud claim to state
law. ERISA claims are another matter. In choosing to regulate
employee benefits, Congress also chose to preempt the field, leaving
plaintiffs no choice but to litigate their contract and fiduciary duty
claims in federal court. There is nothing inherently wrong with
Congress's regulation of these areas or its creation of private
remedies. But even if federal regulation is good as a normalization
of the nation's laws and economy, Congress should fund the judicial
function of its regulation.
b.

Minimum Diversity

Article III authorizes claims between various categories of
parties from different states and countries, with the goal of offering a
more neutral forum to nonresident parties.54 From its creation in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the primary diversity statute has been read as
requiring complete diversity, that is, all plaintiffs must be from a
different state or country than all defendants. 55 In addition,
Congress has always narrowed the diversity docket by imposing an
amount-in-controversy threshold (unmentioned in Article III),
52. Id.
53. McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 201 (3d. Cir. 1989).
54. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at 152 (noting that the neutral forum
goal is absent from the legislative history but expressed in later court opinions).
55. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see also WRIGHT &
KANE, supra note 36, at 158-59 (noting that, with only one exception, the statutory
requirement of complete diversity has been consistently followed).
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rising periodically to today's
starting with $500 in 178956 and
"exceeding $75,000" requirement. 57
But Article III's diversity authorization is broader, allowing
for federal jurisdiction over the specified diversity categories as long
as not all parties are from the same state. This is called minimal
diversity and though little used in the past, its popularity is growing.
In 1948, Congress enacted the interpleader statute to protect
"stakeholders" (such as insurers and fiduciaries) from multiple
findings of liability in different courts adjudicating related claims.
The federal system already had an interpleader claim under Rule 22,
but for non-federal claims, it required complete diversity between all
the claimants and the stakeholder and was little used. 8 Unlike Rule
22 interpleader, the statutory version requires only minimal diversity
between the claimants, that is, all claimants could not be from the
same state or country. The Administrative Office does not tally case
1948 until now, LexisNexis lists
filings under § 1335, but from
59
approximately 854 opinions.
In 1968, Congress enacted the multidistrict litigation
statute-28 U.S.C. § 1407-allowing for the venue transfer of cases
from multiple courts to a single district for consolidated pretrial
The statute's purpose is efficient use of judicial
proceedings.
resources in cases having common pretrial questions that can be
determined more conveniently in a single court. The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation oversees the transfer requests, and in
fiscal year 2004, the Panel considered 22,516 civil actions, granting
transfer on 10,681 cases from ninety-one district courts.6 1 Since
1968, it has transferred 211,317 civil actions for consolidated pretrial
proceedings, with 10,899 being ultimately remanded to the transferor
district for trial, 389 reassigned within the transferee district, and
136,070 actions terminated in the transferee court. 62 These transfers
56. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 12004).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 22. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at 538
(discussing the diversity requirement between the stakeholder and all claimants).
59. LexisNexis search done on April 20, 2005 by author and research
assistant at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 1993).

61. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, at 25 (2004) [hereinafter JudicialBusiness-2004],
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/front/JudicialBusiness.pdf.
62. Id.
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demonstrate the efficiency of § 1407 in cutting workload for the
federal system as a whole, but any assessments of efficiency and
economy must be offset by the costs. Many multidistrict cases
concern subject matter that was not litigated in federal court until the
New Deal (e.g., securities fraud) or later (air crashes, toxic torts)that is, § 1407 has saved labor in areas that required no labor
seventy-five, or even forty years ago. In addition, a net gain in
system-wide efficiency does little to ease the burden suffered by the
transferee court. These burdens have apparently been bearable when
federal courts were adequately funded. They will amplify with
funding cuts.
In the past four years, Congress's efforts to federalize statelaw tort claims has led to two new minimal diversity acts, both
designed to compel new categories of plaintiffs out of state court and
into federal court. The first was the Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Trial Act of 2001, authorizing a single forum for certain
interstate disasters such as air crashes involving at least seventy-five
deaths.63 The act also amends the removal statutes so that cases filed
in various state courts may be compelled into federal court and then
transferred to a single federal district court. 64 For cases meeting this
minimal diversity formula in single-accident settings, the act
legislatively overrules Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss BershadHynes
& Lerach, 65 which held that a court may not use the inconvenient
forum transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to retain a case for trial after
obtaining the case under the multidistrict transfer provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1407. The second recent minimal diversity expansion is the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which creates minimal diversity
over class actions having at least $5 million in controversy and at
least one class member with diverse citizenship from any defendant,
63. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (West 1993 & Supp. 1 2004). The act allows claims
arising from single disasters involving seventy-five or more deaths to be brought in
federal court based on minimal diversity of citizenship between the parties,
meeting any one of three further requirements that (1) one defendant resides in a
state and a substantial part of the accident occurred in another state, or (2) any two
defendants reside in different states, or (3) substantial parts of the accident
occurred in different states. Id. at § 1369(a). The act requires abstention in cases
where "the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of
which the primary defendants are also citizens, where the claims will be governed
by the law of that State." Id. at § 1369(b).
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(e) (West 1993 & Supp. 12004).
65. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
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providing further that the court may decline jurisdiction in certain
specified settings deemed inconsistent with the act's purposes. 66 In
addition to regulating settlements,67 the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 amends the general diversity statute 68 and adds a new removal
statute 69 that when combined with existing venue rules will "allow
corporate defendants to move most large class-actions into federal
court from state courts., 70 Case filing numbers are not yet available
for the new class-action law, but the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts predicts that the act will "result in hundreds of
additional class action cases being brought in federal court each
year." 71 The Multi-party/Multi-forum law, narrowly focused on
singular disasters, will produce far fewer filings but will have a
significant docket impact on any district receiving a case.
3.

The Federal Docket

Civil and criminal case filings are predictably increasing in
federal courts, owing both to Congress's expansion of federal
jurisdiction and the growing American and global economy. In
fiscal year 2004 (FY 2004), district court filings increased nine
percent, with 281,338 civil filings (an 11.2% increase over FY
2003), and criminal filings remaining roughly even with 71,022
filings (up .5% over FY 2003).72 Bankruptcy filings fell 2.6% this
year, but remain high at 1,618,987, up 83.3% from FY 1995. 73
Although the new bankruptcy act President Bush signed on April 20,
2005, may lower filings over time, the immediate result will no
doubt be a spike in filings to clear the proposed act's effective date,
66. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 1, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 4 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
67. Id. at § 3.
68. Id. at § 4 (redefining 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) class action jurisdiction and
specifying grounds for declining jurisdiction).
69. Id. at § 5 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1453).
70. David Rogers, Senate Poised to Pass Class Action Bill, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2005, at A10.
71. News Release, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Judiciary Asks
Congress to Ease Financial Hardships of Courts, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/index/html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Judiciary Asks Congress] (follow the hyperlink matching the title of
the news release under the "April 2005" heading).
72. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 11.
73. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 11.
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scheduled in the current bill for 180 days after the act's adoption.7 4
For the courts of appeals, FY 2004 was the tenth consecutive year of
increases with 62,762 appeals filed, up 3.1% over FY 2003 and up
twenty-five percent in the past decade.75 More significantly, the
appellate courts are slowing in case resolution, with cases pending at
the end of FY 2004 up 14.3% from FY 2003.76 Since 1990-the
date of the most recent comprehensive federal judgeship bill-no
new federal appellate judgeships have been created even though the
appeals docket has grown by forty-six percent in that time, while in
the same period, thirty-four new federal district judgeships were
created to meet a thirty-nine percent docket increase.77
In considering the current budget shortages, a more important
picture emerges in examining the past twenty years. From 1960 to
2004, civil filings increased from 59,284 to 281,338 (475%) while
the number of judges increased from 245 to 679 (277%).78 From
1977 (the starting year for this table) to 2004, civil filings increased
from 133,929 to 281,338 (210%); during this time federal question
filings increased 284% (from 58,083 to 165,241) while diversity
filings increased at the lesser rate of 213% (from 31,735 to
67,624), 79 showing not only growth, but that growth is more
attributable to Congress's federalization of the law than it is to
diversity litigation.
The criminal docket is an additional concern, not merely for
overall court operations, but particularly for private civil litigants
who will be bumped to the lowest priority by the Speedy Trial Act. 80
Although criminal cases make up only twenty percent of the case
filings, 1 they consume disproportionate time compared with civil
74. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005).
75. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 11.
76. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 11.
77. News Release, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Conference Calls
Off-Site Security for Judges Top Priority, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2005), available at
www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Off-Site Security] (follow the hyperlink matching the title of the news
release under the "March 2005" heading).
78. Table 2.1, supra note 51.
79. Table 2.1, supra note 51.
80. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-74 (West 2000 & Supp. I
2004).
81. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 11 (noting that for fiscal year
2004, there were 352,360 civil and criminal filings in federal district courts, of
which 71,022 were criminal cases).
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cases, many of which never have a court hearing. 82 The extra time
provided for criminal trials and their priority on the docket has been
amplified by Congress's rampant expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction, raising various concerns. The Criminal Justice Section
of the American Bar Association formed a task force to examine the
"astonishing" expansion of federal criminal law, 83 and in 1998
issued its report, The Federalization of Criminal Law, noting a
"widespread concern about the number of new federal crimes being
created annually by Congress," 84 and the "[r]ecent dramatic increase
in the number and variety of federal crimes." 85 The report explains
that in the first years following the Constitution's adoption in 1789,
federal crimes were fewer than a dozen and dealt with offenses
against the federal government itself such as "treason, bribery of
federal officials, perjury in federal court, theft of government
property, and revenue fraud.",86 Federal criminal jurisdiction
expanded in the last third of the nineteenth century with the passage
of federal mail fraud statutes linked to interstate commerce, and
again with Prohibition in the early twentieth century.8 7 The 1960s
and 70s saw another expansion in the concern over organized crime
and street gangs, which then "dramatically" expanded in the 1980s
and 90s. As of 1998, of the federal crimes enacted since 1865, more
than forty percent have been enacted since 1970, and more than
twenty-five percent from 1980 to 1996 (the year in which the date
was compiled for the ABA study).88 One tally the report failed to
determine is the current number of federal crimes, explaining that "it
may be impossible to determine exactly how many federal crimes
could be prosecuted today .... ,89
Looking at the most recent Congress at the time of the study,
82. See generally David R. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District
Courts: More Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1579 (1995) (discussing
massive expansion of criminal caseload in federal courts).
83. James Strazella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST. 10.

84. Id. at 1.
85. Id. at2.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 6-7.
88. Strazella, supra note 82, at 7 n.9.
89. Strazella, supra note 83, at 2; see Strazella, supra note 83, at 10
(discussing criminal sanctions under administrative regulation); Strazella, supra
note 83, at 10 n.13 (noting that the vast percentage of regulations connect
congressional statutory prohibitions to the context of the regulation).

Winter 2006]

REDUCEDFUNDING OF COURTS

the report concludes that "[a]ll signs indicate that the federalization
trend is growing, not slowing, in fact as well as perception ....An
estimated 1,000 bills dealing with criminal statutes were introduced
in the most recent [105th] Congress." 90 Many of these crimes
duplicate state laws and were enacted "without requests for their
enactment from state or federal law enforcement officials." 91
Rather, the ABA Task Force was told explicitly by more than one
source that many of these new federal laws are passed "not because
federal prosecution of these crimes is necessary but because federal
92
crime legislation in general is thought to be politically popular."
4.

Technology and Other Changes

Apart from the Congress's jurisdictional expansions, federal
courts are also struggling with other recent laws that reflect changing
times and technology. Courts are quickly moving to electronic
document filing, a change which will save filing and storage space
but will require frequent and expensive updates in equipment along
with more highly trained clerical personnel to manage the system.
Online filing brings several conveniences to the court, such as saved
space and easier document retrieval, but those advantages are not
entirely net gains. They are somewhat offset by the need for a
different level of file maintenance, the need to employ more highlytrained clerical personnel, and the cost of periodic equipment
upgrades-the old file cabinets and even the rolling shelve--did not
require regular replacement as computer systems now do, with
technology costs consuming six percent of the Salaries and Expenses
budget. 93 Perhaps the most onerous aspect of the new technology 9is4
Congress's decision for online posting in the e-Government Act.
For several years now, federal courts have maintained web sites
accessible by the public that included location and contact
information for both the judges and the clerks, copies of local rules
and standing orders, and any individual local rules a judge may
90. Strazella, supra note 83, at 11.
91. Strazella, supra note 83, at 2.
92. Strazella, supra note 83, at 2.
93. Cost-ContainmentReport, supra note 3, at 35.
94. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(c)(3)(A),
116 Stat. 2899, 2914 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 44
U.S.C.A. and 5 U.S.C.A.) (West Supp. I 2004) (providing for the coordination of
federal information through online posting).
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impose. 95 As of April 16, 2005, the e-Government Act adds to this
the requirement that each federal district post online each court's
docket information, the substance of all written opinions issued by
each court, in a text-searchable format, regardless of the publication
designation, and all documents filed electronically by parties. 96 No
data are available on the labor impact this will bring to the judges'
and district clerks, but assuming the system is well maintained, the
result will no doubt be an increase in the work formerly required in
simply hole punching the nine-by-twelve document and clasping it in
the file. This, too, will require more highly-trained personnel, not to
mention the burden it imposes on judges and their staffs to draft each
order as though the world will be viewing and possibly citing it.
Another aspect of changing times is the growing need for
both on-site and off-site security for judges in the wake of occasional
violence and frequent threats. On March 15, 2005, the Judicial
Conference of the United States passed a resolution calling on the
Justice Department and the Marshall's Service to review security
policies, and on Congress and the President to provide the necessary
money. 97 Because of the paralyzing effect of threats against judges,
it is certain that the security services will respond, and it is equally
certain that more security will mean more cost. The money paid to
the Marshall's Service (part of the Executive Branch) is not
separately funded but like the rent comes out of the judiciary's
budget. As a fixed cost, it will come out first. Unless Congress
reverses its budget-stripping agenda and fully accounts for the
entirety of the increased security costs, the debit will be against the
operating costs.
Other burdens arise when case filings surge in a particular
area, caused by changes in the law such as the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005,98 the Bankruptcy Abuse Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 99 scientific developments that expose toxins
such as asbestos, 100 or corporate scandals resulting in increased
95. See, e.g., U.S. District Court-Northern District of Texas,
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov (last visited Nov. 25, 2005) (providing court
information for the Northern District of Texas).
96. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C.A. § 205(a)-(c).
97. Off-Site Security, supra note 77.
98. JudiciaryAsks Congress, supra note 71.
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005).
100. See Table 2.1, supra note 51 (showing the sporadic nature of asbestos
suits: 11,812 cases were filed in 1988, down to 7,818 in 1989, and back up to
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securities fraud claims. 1 1 Crisis flows inescapably from these
numbers and the resulting negative forecasts discussed in this
section. Perhaps the negative projections will prove wrong, and
instead of crisis, case filings will decline with tort reform, and
electronic filing and file maintenance will require fewer personnel to
manage the docket. No one is predicting such a panacea. The crisis
may be most acute in the personnel numbers. Because of budget
constraints, federal courts lost six percent of their workforce in fiscal
year 2004, and have lost eighteen percent since fiscal year 200 1.102
Critics of Congress's short funding have proposed remedies in the
form of the courts exercising an inherent power either to bill
Congress or raise revenue. 03 Without critiquing them here, they are
constitutionally doubtful at best. A more basic solution exists in the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause which, along with other
doctrines, requires the government to furnish access to courts for
justiciable disputes. Congress may short-fund or even close federal
courts, but if it does, our judicial system must default to the state
courts, a possibility contemplated at the Constitutional Convention.
The next section discusses the duty to furnish a forum (or to provide
access to courts), its exceptions, and its application to all phases of
government.

II.

THE RIGHT OF COURT ACCESS AND THE CORRESPONDING

DUTY TO FURNISH A FORUM

Access to courts is the bedrock of the Anglo-American
system with guarantees dating back at least to the Magna Carta. The
13,809 in 1990; beginning in 1991, filings fell to the 5,000 to 8,000 range from
1991 through 2001 with a high year of 9,111 in 1998, then jumped to 26,818 in
2002, falling the next year to 1,562).
101. See Table 2.1, supra note 51 (showing commodities and exchange cases
and securities actions steadily dropped from 2,649 cases in 1988 to 1,669 cases in
1997, then began a climb to 2,358 in 1998, and jumped from 2,678 in 2000 up to
3,538 in 2001, the year Enron fell). Predictably, employee-benefit claims surged
slightly in 2001 along with the securities claims, and both have retained their
increases up through 2004. See Table 2.1, supra note 51.
102. JudiciaryAsks Congress, supra note 71.
103. See infra notes 329-330 (noting two theories of court-initiated funding
remedies: the "inherent power doctrine," holding that courts have an inherent
power to raise revenue, and the second theory, holding that courts have the power
to bill Congress directly).
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importance of a viable court system is readily apparent in several of
the Magna Carta's clauses, with the barons having forced King John
to guarantee not only the right to a jury trial 10 4 and the right to
justice that was rendered rather than sold, 10 5 but also the availability
of two levels of courts. Specifically, King John guaranteed a
Common Pleas court system apart from the king's court106 and
provided for an available forum for certain claims in the counties
where they arose. 107 As for the king's court, King John pledged that
he or his Chief Justiciary would send two judges through each
county four times a year who, along with locally-elected knights,
would hold court. If the courts could not be held for any reason, a
sufficient number of assigned judges would hold over until the
judicial matters were resolved. 108 A later section, the one pledging
to rid the courts of corruption, has a second clause with a telling ring
for the defunding problem: "To no one will We sell, to none will We
deny or defer, right or justice."10 9
104. MAGNA CARTA cl. 39, reprinted in CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA,
MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 52 (2002).
105. Id. at 52 cl. 40.
106. Id. at 50 cl. 17 ("Common Pleas shall not follow Our Court, but be
holden in some certain place[,J" translated as "Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow
the royal court around, but shall be held in a fixed place.").
107. Id. at 51 cl. 18 ("Recognisances of Novel Disseisin, Mort d'Ancestor,
and Darrein Presentment shall be taken in their proper counties only .....
108. Id.
We Ourself, or, if We be absent from the Realm, Our Chief Justiciary,
shall send two justiciaries through each county four times a year, who,
together with four knights elected out of each shire by the people thereof,
shall hold the said assizes on the day and in the place aforesaid. And if
the said assizes cannot be held on the day appointed, so many of the
knights and freeholders as shall have been present thereat on that day
shall remain as will be sufficient for the administration of justice,
according as the business to be done be greater or less.
Id.
109. MAGNA CARTA cl. 40, reprinted in CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA,
MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 52 (2002); see also William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening

Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I,
Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 333 (1997)
(describing the historical roots of Tennessee's open courts clause and the right to a
judicial remedy in the text of the Magna Carta); Thomas R. Phillips, The
ConstitutionalRight to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309 (2003) (summarizing
English antecedents).
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Blackstone's Commentaries noted that the common law's
three primary rights-life, liberty and property-would be declared
in vain if not for the
subordinate right of every Englishman [to apply] to
the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the
law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's
life, liberty and property, courts of justice must at all
times be open to the subject,
and the law must be duly
10
administered therein.'
In struggling to define a new government with the Articles of
Confederation, England's former American colonies at first rejected
the role of a national judiciary in creating only a national legislature,
leaving executive and judicial power to the states.11 ' When the first
American governmental structure seemed inadequate and a second
Constitutional Convention was organized, delegates argued at length
about the need for and the structure of a federal judiciary. 112 The
result was a balance of power not only among the three federal
branches, but between the federal and state systems as well, a
delicate federalism underscored by the notion that courts of original
jurisdiction would be available-federal courts if Congress created
them, and state courts if it did not.

110. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *137.
In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall quoted Blackstone for the proposition that the
violation of legal rights necessarily implies a remedy: "[I]t is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by
suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803). Marshall further quoted that "it is a settled and invariable principle in the
laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress." Id.
111. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-3 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the

Articles of Confederation and their omission of an executive branch and court
system).
112. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82 (Alexander Hamilton)
(discussing the need for a federal judiciary and suggesting the structure it should
take). See FALLON ET AL., supra note 111, at 4-20 (detailing the debate on the
judiciary at the Constitutional Convention).
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ConstitutionalBases for the Duty to Furnish a Forum

1.

The Constitution's Distribution of Powers for
the Judiciary and the Implicit Need for Courts
of Original Jurisdiction-State or Federal

Improving on the Articles of Confederation, the United States
Constitution created a dichotomous American judiciary which
preserved the state courts' role as the primary judicial body and
provided for federal-court jurisdiction over a limited range of
disputes. In addition to the powers retained by the states, the
Constitution further designed a federal power-balancing system in
which the newly-created federal judiciary would be held in check by

the sharing of judicial appointment-and-removal power by the
president and Congress,1 13 and by Congress having the power to
define federal subject matter jurisdiction within the broad borders set
by Article 111. 14
Article III outlines federal judicial jurisdiction in three ways.
First, it limits federal jurisdiction to nine broad categories (including

two interstitial categories for federal questions and diversity
claims), 1 5 and then gives Congress the power to further define those
interstitial categories.16 Second, Article III requires Congress to
113. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
114. Id.at art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
115. Id.at art. IlH, § 2 (enumerating cases and controversies which the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts may hear)
All Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party; Controversies between: two or
more States, between a State and Citizens of another State, between
citizens of different States, between Citizens of the same State claiming
Land under Grants of different States, between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States Citizens or Subjects.
Id.; see KILLIAN & COSTELLO, supra note 2, at 647-821 (stating that the first five
categories create federal questions (both general and specific), although categories
two through nine may be governed by federal, state, or foreign law).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall
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create one Supreme Court but gives Congress discretion in creating
lower federal courts, including the discretion to create none.
Third, Article III vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction
over all nine categories of Article III cases, except for "Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be party," over which the Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction. 118 Article III thus limits the Supreme
Court's power to appellate review for most Article III cases; it
follows that some lower court must have original jurisdiction1 19
over
courts.'
federal
be
not
need
courts
those
those disputes, although
Against this backdrop of Congressional power to define the
lower federal courts' jurisdiction, does Congress have any duty to
fund them? While it has the authority under Article I's spending
clause and necessary and proper clause, neither Article I nor Article
III require Congress to fund the lower courts-in fact, Congress may
abolish those lower courts. But it must be remembered that the
Constitution also contemplates the availability of courts of original
jurisdiction-state or federal-to hear categories of Article III cases
and controversies. The Constitution's drafters saw a need for some
federal judiciary, at least a Supreme Court, but contemplated that
state courts would be the default forum both for general claims and
federal questions. 120
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."). See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 3d § 3536 (1984 & Supp. 2004) (noting that
controversy remains as to how far Congress may go in creating these courts and
their jurisdictional boundaries).
117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
118. Id. at art. III, § 2.
119. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1362-64,
1372, 1386-87, 1401 (1953) (discussing arguments about Congress's ability to
limit federal jurisdiction and arguing that individuals do not have a right to a
proceeding in federal court). See generally WRIGHT ET AL. supra note 116, at §
3536 (discussing federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a)); see also MARTIN
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 27 (1980) (discussing the jurisdictional limits on state and federal courts);

Paul Bator, CongressionalPower over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27
VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030 (1982) (discussing Congress's power to eliminate the
federal courts).
120. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (stating that state courts
must adjudicate federal question cases over which they have concurrent
jurisdiction).
See also Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional
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Other Constitutional Doctrines Requiring
Access to Courts and the Remedy for Breach

The Constitution's implicit recognition of the right to a
judicial forum goes further than Article III's outline of federal
judicial jurisdiction. Case law based on five constitutional doctrines
endorse some aspect of access to courts: the First Amendment's
petition clause, 121 Fifth Amendment due process, 122 Fourteenth

Amendment due process, 23 Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection, 124 and the privileges and immunities clause from Article
IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. 125
These cases create a claim with resulting remedies of
injunctive relief against the court-blocking law, and in some cases,
money damages against government officials. Supporting language
dates back to at least 1823126 and is summarized in an 1872 Supreme
Court opinion:

Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory
JurisdictionalRules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 827-28 (1983)
(citing several cases in support of the proposition that state courts must provide
access for federal claims comparable to the access they provide for local claims).
121. Bill Johnson's Rests. Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Ltd., 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 1 (1964); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm., 780
F.2d 1422, 1427-29 (8th Cir. 1986).
122. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989); Walters v. Nat'l Assn.
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985).
123. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
124. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).
125. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
75-80 (1873) (stating in dictum the range of privileges and immunities under
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment).
126. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (stating
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause governs rights "which are in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union" and lists as one of several examples, the right "to
institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state"); see also
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (finding that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause allows one to enter any state in the Union and maintain
actions in that state).
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The right to sue and defend in the courts is the
alternative to force. In an organized society it is the
right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government. It is one of the
highest and most essential privileges of citizenship,
and must be allowed by each state to the citizens of
all other states to the precise extent that it is allowed
to its own citizens. 127

As Justice Souter explained in Christopher v. Harbury, the
cases fall into two areas-those challenging a rule or regulation that
impedes access to courts, and those seeking damages for the
defendants' having undermined a plaintiff's case-one either already
litigated or about to be litigated.
The first line of cases in which a rule or regulation impeded
court access established the rights of prisoners' access regarding
appeals or post-conviction relief. These included such underlying
rights as eliminating requirements that habeas petitions be properly
drawn 129 by the parole board's legal investigator, 130 the elimination
of filing fees for habeas claims, 1 31 the availability of free trial
transcripts for appeals,' 32 the appointment of legal counsel for
indigent defendants' appeals,' 33 access to law books,' 34 and related
claims. 135 A similar line of holdings invokes the right to access to
127. Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148 (holding that Ohio's wrongful death statute's
exclusion of plaintiff's claim did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause)
(citations omitted).
128. 536 U.S. 403,413-14 (2002).
129. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 258 (1942).
130. Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
131. Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708, 709 (1961).
132. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1971).
133. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
134. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
135. E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (holding that prison
cannot unreasonably bar assistance from other prisoners in preparing lawsuits);
acc'd, Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that
disciplining prisoner for having pursued prior lawsuit violates access to courts
rule); Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979); Harris v. Pate, 440
F.2d 315, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that right of access to courts requires
continuance to allow prisoner time to obtain affidavits); Sigafus v. Brown, 416
F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that sheriff's destruction of lawsuit papers
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courts to strike down filing fee requirements for indigents in divorce
137
cases 136 and for the record-preparation fees in child custody cases.
The Supreme Court has twice used the doctrine to disallow state bar
associations' efforts to prevent unions from using in-house38 attorneys
and union staffers to assist members with legal problems.'
These cases involved single-issue impediments to litigation
such as filing fees, but some courthouse bars may overtly block the
lawsuit in its entirety. Bars to litigation are legitimate in most
instances, including limits on subject matter jurisdiction, time bars,
and anti-suit injunctions. But even these fundamental bars have
exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction limits have been held
unconstitutional where they distinguish between residents and
nonresidents in pursuing certain claims. 139 Limitations periods may
not be arbitrary. 140 Anti-suit injunctions between different
for habeas claim interferes with access to the courts); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at
822-23 n.8 (listing more examples of such cases).
136. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
137. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996).
138. United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22
(1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
139. E.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1951) (holding that
Wisconsin cannot use its subject matter jurisdiction rules to bar a wrongful death
claim arising in Illinois); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 254-55 (1898) (finding
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause bars Tennessee from denying
nonresident creditors access to courts to pursue claims against insolvent
corporations, or giving preference to resident creditors over nonresident creditors);
cf Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 151 (1907) (finding that an
Ohio wrongful death statute limiting claims to Ohio decedents did not violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
140. Although statutes of limitation are old and pervasive, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (1988), the Supreme Court has emphasized that they
are not a fundamental right, Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945), and they do encounter constitutional bars. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania's six-year limitation period for
paternity actions violated equal protection). The test, which varies according to
the category of claim and its discoverability, is whether the time period provides
plaintiff with an "opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged."
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (striking down
Illinois's 120-day period for convening a conference with the state employment
commission). In addition, a forum state may not apply its own limitation period to
a transitory action, even though it has jurisdiction over the parties, if it lacks a
reasonable connection to the dispute. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,
410 (1930) (noting that a state "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its
borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them").
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jurisdictions must overcome a strong presumption favoring the
exercise of jurisdiction. 14 1 Creative litigants have also used federal
substantive law in attempts to block oncoming litigation, and have
failed because of their opponents' First Amendment right to petition.
Examples include the attempted use of antitrust laws to block
1 42
lawsuits by a competitor seeking to enforce trucking regulations,
and unfair labor practice laws to block an employer's well-founded
lawsuit even though it was43 filed in retaliation for an employee
exercising a protected right.'
The second line of access-to-court cases involves
obstruction-of-justice claims for tampering with or spoliation of
evidence by government actors. Unlike the first category in which
the goal is merely to remove an impediment to the suit, the access
claims in this second category may be distinct grounds for recovery
where the cover-up undermined or prevented an earlier lawsuit. Bell
v. City of Milwaukee 14 is an example of the years that can pass
before the access claim is brought. A Milwaukee policeman shot
and killed Daniel Bell in 1958.145 When he admitted the crime years
later, Thomas Grady claimed the gun accidentally discharged when
he was pursuing the unarmed Bell. 146 But at the time, Grady and
fellow-officer Krause fabricated a story that Bell had attacked them

141. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (denying a
request for a federal court injunction against state litigation); Gau Shan Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1358 (6th Cir. 1992) (denying a request for a
federal injunction against Hong Kong litigation); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper,
925 S.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Tex. 1996) (denying a request for an anti-suit injunction
against Illinois litigation). In addition, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §
2283 (West 1994), forbids federal injunctions against state litigation except where
expressly authorized by Congress, or in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate a federal court judgment. Note that the anti-suit injunction
does not control the second court's treatment of the order to cease litigation. See
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998) (allowing a witness
enjoined from testifying in a case in Michigan to testify in a case before the
Missouri Supreme Court). See generally James P. George, ParallelLitigation, 51
BAYLOR L. REv. 769 (1999) (discussing parallel litigation in various contexts).
142. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)
(finding no antitrust violation where trucking companies "conspired" to bring
regulatory claims against competitors).
143. Bill Johnson's Rests. Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
144. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
145. Id. at 1215.
146. Id. at 1216.
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with a knife. 147 Bell's father sued in 1959 and after a mistrial,
settled for $1,800 and dismissed his claim. 148 Bell's father died in
1962, and in 1978, one of the officers confessed the cover-up to the
district attorney. 149 This later investigation led to Bell's siblings
filing a new claim in 1979, for which a jury awarded $1,590,670 on
various claims. 15 On appeal, defendants' objections included a
challenge to the viability of plaintiffs' access to justice claim, which
was founded on a federal civil rights statute governing obstruction of
justice.151 Rejecting defendants' argument that obstruction of justice
required more than merely impeding a private cause of action, the
court held that "[t]o deny such access defendants need52not literally
bar the courthouse door or attack plaintiffs' witnesses."'
Ryland v. Shapiro was a claim for Lavonna Ryland's death,
initially ruled a suicide.' 53 Her parents were skeptical and pushed
further investigation. She had been shot at the home of Alfred
Shapiro, an assistant district attorney who was later convicted of her
murder, although on appeal that conviction was set aside for
insufficient evidence. Nonetheless, Ryland's parents sued Shapiro
and two other prosecutors, alleging that after shooting her, Shapiro
had telephoned assistant district attorney Edward Roberts and asked
him to come to Shapiro's home. Afterward, Roberts and district
attorney Edwin Ware prevented a full investigation into the causes of
Ryland's death by cancelling her autopsy, attempting to persuade
local doctors and coroners to sign death certificate reporting this as a
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1226.
149. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1223.
150. Id. at 1224-25.
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (West 2000) (the statute is headed "[d]epriving
persons of rights or privileges" and provides a civil remedy for anyone "injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having or exercising any right or privilege as
a citizen of the United States .... ").
152. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1261. Although Bell's holding suggests that intentional
cover-ups are a minimum, the access claim has been recognized for simple
negligence, where the court clerk negligently delayed filing the appeal petition.
See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1972) ("[A}Section 1983 Action
may be based on negligence when it leads to deprivation of rights."); Crews v.
Petrosky, 509 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("An allegation that a clerk of
state court has negligently delayed the filing of a petition for appeal, and that the
delay has interfered with an individual's right of access to the courts may state a
cause of action.").
153. 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).
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suicide, and telling the police it was a suicide. 154 Ryland's parents
filed a civil rights claim against Shapiro, Roberts and Ware, alleging
that their cover-up interfered with the parents' access to the state
courts with a wrongful death claim against Shapiro. 155 The federal
district court dismissed but the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that
"[t]he right of access to the courts is basic to our system of
government, and it is well established today that it is one of the
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.' ' 156 Looking to
precedent, the court continued that "[a] mere formal right of access
to the courts does not pass Constitutional muster. Courts have
57
required that the access be 'adequate, effective, and meaningful."1
Finding both a right of access to courts and that the plaintiffs' right
the dismissal and
here had been abridged, the Fifth Circuit reversed 58
merits.
the
on
consideration
for
remanded the case
In a similar claim, Erin Delew died when her bicycle was
struck by Janet Wagner, who was initially exonerated in an
investigation by the Las Vegas police and the Nevada Highway
Patrol. 159 Delew's husband and parents rejected this and sued both
Wagner and several officials. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
Wagner was driving thirty percent over the speed limit, that she had
been drinking and was allowed to leave the accident scene without
being tested, that this was done because Wagner was married to a
Las Vegas police officer, and that the subsequent investigation was a
cover-up of Wagner's negligent actions. The federal trial court
dismissed but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the right of
access to courts is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution"' 60 and more specifically that "the Constitution
guarantees plaintiffs the right of meaningful access to the courts, the
154. Id. at 969.
155. Id. at 969-70.
156. Id. at 971.
157. Id. at 972 (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)). The
Ryland court went on to state that "[o]f what avail is it to the individual to arm him
with a panoply of constitutional rights if, when he seeks to vindicate them, the
courtroom can be hermetically sealed against him by a functionary who, by refusal
or neglect, impedes the filing of his papers?" Id. (quoting McCray v. Maryland,
456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1972)).
158. Ryland, 708 F.2d at 976.
159. Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998).
160. Id. at 1222 (citing Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142,
148 (1907)).
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denial of which is established where a party engages in pre-filing
actions which effectively covers up 6evidence
and actually renders
1
any state court remedies ineffective."'
Another theory, apparently untested, is that the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial compels the government to furnish
both a forum and a jury. None of the cases arguing for basic access
to courts have relied on this premise, but a 1988 law review article
examined this question in light of Congress's 1986 low budgeting of
the judiciary and the resulting Judicial Conference order suspending
jury trials from June 16 through September 30, 1986.162 That order
led to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Armster v. United States that a
163
three-month delay in the right to a jury trial was unconstitutional.
This set the stage for the 1988 law review article's argument that if
Congress failed to budget the courts sufficiently to pay the costs of
jury trials, it would be in breach of an affirmative duty to underwrite
the jury-trial guaranty, justifying
the courts to empanel a jury and
64
Congress.'
to
bill
send the
The strongest discussion endorsing a right to court access
comes from a case denying a forum for a habeas petition. In
Johnson v. Eisentrager, German nationals were captured by
American military forces in China after World War II hostilities had
ceased. 165 They were accused of war crimes 166 and transported to
Germany for detention awaiting a military trial. The accused filed
161. Id. (citing Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.
1997)); see also Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm., 780 F.2d 1422,
1427-29 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that frivolous condemnation counterclaim in state
court action intended to intimidate plaintiffs violated their First Amendment
petition rights); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1387 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that bad faith criminal prosecution violated plaintiffs First Amendment
petition rights).
162. Bunge, supra note 1, at 237-38 (citation omitted).
163. 792 F.2d at 1430.
164. See Bunge, supra note 1, at 256-72 (basing the argument on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which holds that the government may not
condition the receipt of its benefits, even discretionary benefits, upon the
nonassertion of constitutional rights).
165. 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950).
166. Id. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs claimed they
were German civilians working in China, and were accused of giving information
to the Japanese military in China after Germany had surrendered and argued that
whether plaintiffs' giving information to the Japanese military was a war crime
was "not so simple a question as the Court assumes").
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habeas petitions in the Southern District of New York, claiming
innocence and seeking trials in the United States rather than military
tribunals in Germany. The district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the foreign-held plaintiffs, but the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed with strong language stating that if
Congress had intended to restrict habeas relief to prisoners held
within the United States, such restrictions violated the right to court
access.167 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
upheld the trial court's theory that the Constitution's protections,
though covering aliens in many situations, had territorial limitations
that fell short of these claims. 168 But in so holding, the Court
strongly underscored the ancient right of court access for most
claimants. It first noted that the law-both common law and
international law-had originally held that enemy aliens (citizens of
enemy countries) historically could not bring civil claims, but that
the United States had grown beyond this by 1813 when Joseph Kent
upheld the right of a British national residing in the United States to
bring a claim for a debt contracted before the War of 1812.169 Kent
held that "[a] lawful residence implies protection, and a capacity to
sue and be sued."' 170 The Johnson court then quoted from a thenrecent Supreme Court holding reaffirming Kent:
The ancient rule against suits by resident alien
enemies has survived only so far as necessary to
prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose
which might hamper our own war effort or give aid to
the enemy. This may be taken as the sound principle
of the common law today. 171
Johnson then distinguished the group who lacked such
access-nonresident enemy aliens who remained in service to the
hostile country. 172 Johnson's importance is not only in recognizing
167. Eisenstrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-70 (1950).
168. 339 U.S. at 776-91.
169. Id. at 776 (citing Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69 (N.Y. 1813)).
170. Id. In Clarke v. Morey, Kent cited the common law for the alien's right
to sue and traced the English origins to the "Magna Charta." 10 Johns. at 70.
171. Johnson, 339 U.S..at 776 (quoting Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75
(1942)).

172. Id. at 777-78.
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this broad right of court access, extending to citizens and aliens
except those nonresident aliens who were nationals of an enemy
country, but in characterizing the right as one of common law,
ancient and modern. That is, the ancient common law guaranteed
citizens access to courts, and by 1813 the American common law
had extended that access to resident aliens, including citizens of
enemy countries if such access would not aid the enemy. 173 In
addition to Johnson's strong support for court access for most
claimants, three dissenters led by Hugo Black argued that the Court
of Appeals was right and that even these nonresident enemy aliens
(who had not been combatants), being detained by the United States
military, had 174
a right to a habeas hearing in a federal court in the
United States.
The constitutional claim for access to courts cannot be
doubted--even cases holding that the access right was not abridged
have nonetheless affirmed its existence. 175 In addition to these five
constitutional doctrines and their caselaw endorsements, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments reserve all rights not delineated within the
173. Id. at 776-77.
174. Id. at 791-98 (Black, J., dissenting).
175. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (holding that access-tocourts claim requires a showing that the underlying claim could have been
maintained absent interference or cover-up); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557 (1987) (holding that there is no right to appointed counsel for habeas
proceedings); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333
(1985) (holding that Congress's limiting attorney's fees to $10 for veterans'
disability claims did not violate right of access to courts); Chambers v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907) (holding that Ohio wrongful death statute
limiting claims to Ohio decedents did not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause); Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that plaintiff's failure to make some attempt to pursue claim in court precluded
recovery for impeding right of access); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that delay caused by alleged conspiracy did not deprive
plaintiffs' right to court access); Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that alleged conduct by city denying access to courts did not
violate "clearly established right" of access to courts); Williams v. City of Boston,
784 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiffs had no right to information
that was withheld from them); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that expulsion from football team in retaliation for successful lawsuit to
obtain scholarship was not a denial of access to courts); Nordgren v. Milliken, 762
F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that prison's contracting with attorneys to
prepare habeas petitions for prisoners instead of furnishing a prison library did not
violate access to courts).
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Constitution's limited government framework to the states and the
people. 176 The doctrine of reserved rights has never been litigated in
this regard, or perhaps even proposed as supporting access to state
courts. But we have never faced the prospect of expanding federal
jurisdiction over state law claims being removed to federal courts
with dwindling resources. To the extent that state laws or the
common law guarantee access to courts, Congress's failure to fund
federal courts (or any other federal failure) returns this function to
the state courts unless, unthinkably, the right of court access can be
preempted and then ignored.
B.

Forum Availability as a Duty Imposed on Three
Branches of Government

English antecedents and the constitutional doctrines
discussed above impose access-to-court duties on all three branches
of the United States government, with some of the doctrines also
applying to state governments. Chief Justice Marshall stated the
government-wide duty in Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of the government is to afford that
protection . . . . [The] government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish
no
77
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. 1
Marshall made the observation quoted above as a premise to
fashioning a remedy for Marbury in response to President Jefferson's
withdrawal of a government appointment. Marbury lost, however,
because he had mistakenly sought an original mandamus in the
Supreme Court-the wrong forum-and thus had his claim
dismissed for lack of original jurisdiction. 178 The case is nonetheless
a milestone of American jurisprudence for its establishment of the
176. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, X.
177. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
178. Id. at 137.
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Court's inherent power to infer a remedy in the absence of an
express cause of action, as well as the president's susceptibility to
judicial review. But Marshall's quote reaches further than the facts
in Marbury, recognizing the government's broader duty to "afford
that protection"-that is, the assessment of facts in light179of the law, a
primarily judicial function since the time of King John.
Marshall's edict that a legal right implies a remedy has been
somewhat curtailed since the time of Marbury. Legislatures, for
example, may create a public right for the accurate labeling of
pharmaceuticals but limit enforcement to government agencies and
withhold a private remedy, as Congress did in Merrell Dow. 180 It is
important to note, however, that the federal pharmaceutical standards
at issue in Merrell Dow did not displace plaintiffs' right to seek
damages in state court (or in a federal diversity claim) for common
law negligence. Plaintiffs thus retained their day in court and a
remedy, but without the extra claim invented by Congress-a claim
for a private right that did not exist under the federal regulatory
scheme.
The fact that modem regulatory law can create public rights
without creating private remedies does not detract in the least from
Marbury's express notion that the breach of a common law right
entails a remedy, and the necessary implication that the court,
through judicial review, is the means of obtaining that remedy.
Without a right of court access for appropriate claims, Marbury's
fundamental equation fails.
Apart from Marbury, the doctrine is more fully developed in
a number of cases arising in various fact settings that illustrate the
right of court access, the government's corresponding duties, and the
exceptions. Although this article argues that a breach of Congress's
duty is underway, it is important to establish first the duty of court
access as applicable to all three branches-it may have exceptions in
narrow settings as explained in each section below, but the duty is
pervasive.

179. See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 120, at 829-33 (1983) (discussing
how state courts provide forums for actions arising under the laws of the federal
government and other state governments).
180. 478 U.S. 804, 806 (1986) (finding that Ohio's incorporation of federal
drug-labeling standards into state law did not create a federal question in the
absence of Congressional intent to create a private remedy).
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1.

The Court's Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction

In a case requiring state courts to hear federal claims, the
Supreme Court has recognized "the common fealty of all courts,
both state and national, to both state and national constitutions, and
the duty resting upon them, when it [is] within the scope of their
authority, to protect and enforce rights lawfully created .... 181
Apart from categorical endorsements for court access such as this,
the court's duty is best explained through its exceptions, with
emphatic explanations of the strong presumption favoring
jurisdiction and the narrowness of the exception. The cases are
based on a variety of distinct doctrines involving courts declining or
deferring jurisdiction in the face of such matters as significant
inconvenience to a litigant, wasteful parallel litigation, or federalism
and other policy conflicts between jurisdictions. The conflicts arise
in multiple settings, between state and federal courts, between sisterstate courts, and between American and foreign courts. Standing
against these remedies of dismissal or deferral is a strong
presumption-in some cases a requirement-that the court exercise
jurisdiction. The non-exercise of jurisdiction is generally premised
on the availability of another suitable forum.
a.

DecliningCasesfor Convenience and
Efficiency

Significant inconvenience to litigants and the waste of
parallel lawsuits are both grounds for declining jurisdiction under a
variety of multi-faceted tests. Because all applicable doctrines
require that an alternative forum be available, due process and the
right of court access are not implicated. Forum non conveniens is a
common ground for declining otherwise valid jurisdiction. There are
two categories: venue transfers within the same jurisdiction, and the
interjurisdictional forum switch requiring dismissal in the first forum
for refiling in a distinct second forum. In the intrajurisdictional
venue transfer, forum availability is a given because the case is
merely transferred within the same system without dismissal. That
safeguard is missing for the interjurisdictional transfer because of
dismissal and the need to obtain jurisdiction in the second forum.
181. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 223

(1915).
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For the cross-jurisdictional cases (and the domestic ones as well), a
strong presumption favors plaintiffs choice of forum, 182 and
plaintiffs court access is not threatened because the dismissal is
premised on the availability of another suitable forum.' 83 To ensure
court access, the first forum normally grants a conditional dismissal
based on defendant's agreement to refiling in the second forum, to
litigate on the merits, and to waive any objections to jurisdiction,
venue, time limitations or other procedural bars. 184 Throughout the
law of inconvenient forum-from the presumption favoring
plaintiff's initial forum choice to the safeguards for movement to the
second forum-the right to court access is a prime concern, at least
in the required court analysis. However, so as not to overstate the
protection for plaintiffs, the law of forum non conveniens does not
require an equal second forum, only an adequate one. Plaintiff may
face a less favorable law or different procedural requirements. 85 To
the extent that plaintiffs fail to re-file in the second forum, the
doctrine may be seen as denying meaningful court access. On the
other hand, defendants have a right to meaningful court access as
well. Assuming that courts grant forum non conveniens dismissals
only in cases posing significant burdens on the defendant-a limit
the doctrine contemplates but no doubt exceeds in many cases-its
unavailability could mean equal fairness in many cases.
Parallel litigation is a second category of cases justifying the
declining of jurisdiction. In dealing with parallel cases, a court has
four choices: (1) allow both cases to proceed with the first to
judgment having whatever preclusive effect it may have; (2) stay its
own case for possible litigation later on any claims surviving
preclusion; (3) dismiss its own case; or (4) enjoin a party from

182. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) ("[T]here is
ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiffs choice of forum .... ");
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (holding that state courts may
apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens when appropriate, but there is an
interest in having local cases tried locally); Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335
F.3d 633, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2003) (same).
183. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 506-07; PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
184. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195,
205-06 (2d Cir. 1987) (analyzing different procedural requirements before
dismissing actions forforum non conveniens).
185. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247-54 (holding that unfavorable law
should not be a significant consideration in aforum non conveniens inquiry).

Winter 2006]

REDUCEDFUNDING OF COURTS

litigating in the other forum. 186 Parallel litigation, at least in theory,
has no court-access problem; to the contrary, the parties have access
to two or more courts. But the law surrounding parallel litigation
nonetheless illustrates the importance of court access. For example,
the inadequacy of the other forum is a valid objection to a stay or
dismissal in the desired forum, 187 although this ground is less clear
for anti-suit injunctions. 188 As with inconvenient forum, in most
settings a presumption favors the first-filing plaintiffs choice of
89
forum, although other factors may overcome that presumption.'
The Colorado River doctrine dealing with parallel litigation between
federal and state courts illustrates this well. In stating the strong
presumption against staying a federal lawsuit in deference to a firstfiled state-court case, the Supreme Court noted a "virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
given them."' 190 The Court drew this presumption from three cases
starting with Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Cohens v.
Virginia--"It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if
it should not: but is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it
186. George, supra note 141, at 777-81.
187. E.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
17 n.20 (1983) (stating that a stay was necessary to "deter vexatious use of the
federal courts").
188. Federal circuits are split into two camps on the standards for anti-suit
injunctions, but both include the factor of protecting the forum's public policies.
Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352-54 (6th Cir. 1992). The
adequacy of the other forum is not an express factor in the test, although in Gau
Shan, the district court enjoined the litigation in Hong Kong on the grounds that
allowing it to continue would violate the federal courts' policy of a just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action. Id. at 1354. The court of appeals
reversed, based on comity and the principle that anti-suit injunctions should be
issued in only the most extreme cases. Id. at 1358-59. That the law of anti-suit
injunctions does not emphasize the other forum's adequacy is somewhat irrelevant
to the goal of promoting court access. To the contrary, to promote anti-suit
injunctions would impair court access if the enjoining forum itself was inadequate.
189. See George, supra note 141, at 785-812 (explaining that for parallel
cases within the same jurisdiction there is no presumption favoring the litigation of
both cases, based on the efficient use of that jurisdiction's judicial resources).
190. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976). The Court nonetheless dismissed the federal case and in doing so
defined the doctrine for overcoming the strong presumption favoring proceeding
with a validly-filed case. Id. at 817-20; see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36,
at 338-41 (discussing those factors); George, supra note 141, at 855-64 (discussing
ColoradoRiver in detail).
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91

b.

Declining Cases Based on Federalism

Abstaining from interference with state interests is yet
another grounds for declining jurisdiction and thereby denying
plaintiffs choice of forum. The Pullman doctrine is a good
example, derived from a case in which the Texas Railroad
Commission had ordered that a conductor be stationed on all trains
having a Pullman sleeping car. 192 In the late 1930s, the railroads and
the Pullman Company had a practice of assigning one porter (a lower
rank than conductor) to each Pullman car, with one conductor in
charge of all passenger cars for the train.1 93 But many trains in rural

191. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

The other two cases were

McClellan v. Carland,217 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1910) (finding that the federal court
had a duty to adjudicate the case before it and could not defer to a state court
which had intervened in the federal action), and England v. Louisiana State Board
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964) (reversing the district court's
dismissal of plaintiff's constitutional claims, recognizing plaintiff's right to return
to the federal court after initial Pullman abstention required intermediate resort to
state court). This strong presumption favoring the retention of the federal case
does not apply to federal declaratory judgment actions brought by state court
defendants. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995) (clarifying
Colorado River and holding that federal courts have a broad discretion in
dismissing federal declaratory judgment actions that parallel state lawsuits).
Discussing the Supreme Court's declining of its original jurisdiction in Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), Professor Shapiro questions
the Court's reliance on this Cohens quote (above), used in Wyandotte's reference
to "the time honored maxim of the Anglo-American common law tradition that a
court possessed of jurisdiction generally must exercise it." David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 561 (1985) (discussing
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 496-97). Shapiro argues that jurisdiction is more
discretionary than obligatory and questions Wyandotte's invocation of this
seemingly sweeping maxim while citing only Cohens. Id. at 570-71. While
Shapiro makes valid points about the range of judicial discretion in exercising
jurisdiction (including the discretion to refuse an injunction because the applicant
failed to prove the required elements), his questioning the existence of the "timehonored maxim" does not consider the due process and First Amendment lines of
cases discussed in this article.
192. R.R. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 497-98, 501-02 (1941)
(noting that the disputes may involve parallel litigation but are governed by
federalism concerns rather than traditional parallel litigation laws); George, supra
note 141, at 864-75 (discussing federalism concerns in the Pullman doctrine).
193. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497.
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Texas had only one passenger car, a Pullman sleeper.' 94 Rather than
staff it with two employees-a conductor and a porter-the Pullman
Company merely had a porter in charge. 195 At the time, all
The
conductors were white and all porters were black. 196
conductors' union obtained the Railroad Commission's order
requiring a conductor, which, as a matter of economics displaced the
porters. 97 The Pullman Company and the railroads sued in federal
court to enjoin the Commission from enforcing the order, and the
porters intervened to raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
objections. 198 Plaintiffs lost in front of a three-judge district court,
leading to a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 199 A unanimous
Court reversed in Justice Frankfurter's classic opinion which noted
that this dispute, unlitigated in Texas, was based on an order by2 0 0a
state agency whose delegated power was broad and ambiguous.
Citing the need to avoid constitutional encounters between state and
federal law, the Court reasoned that if the Commission's order were
held invalid under Texas law, the constitutional issue would be
moot. 20 1 The Court remanded the case with orders that it20 be
stayed
2
and that the parties seek a resolution in Texas state courts.
Pullman can be hastily read as requiring exhaustion of
remedies for constitutional challenges to state law. This reading is
inaccurate because the Court emphasized that the abstention
requirement applied, under these facts, only because this was a
question of first impression under Texas law. The resulting
abstention rule, which varies slightly among the circuits, is that
federal courts should temporarily abstain from questioning the
constitutionality of ambiguous state laws that have not been litigated
in that state's courts.20 3 Cases falling short of these requirements
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 498.
198. Pulman., 312 U.S. at 498.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 499-500.
201. Id. at 501.
202. Id. at 501-02.
203. See George, supra note 141, at 866-67 (discussing the Pullman tests in
the various circuits); see also United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878
F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that the Second Circuit's three-part test: (1)
unclear state law (2) raising a constitutional issue, and (3) susceptible to a
reasonable interpretation that would avoid the constitutional issue).
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must remain in federal court.
Pullman abstention is a valid exercise of federalism, but the
opinion left unresolved the potential unfairness of denying plaintiff a
properly-invoked federal forum for a constitutional question. Of
course, Pullman stays do not deny court access as such. To the
contrary, two courts are made available, with the state court having
jurisdiction equal to the federal court's to litigate the constitutional
claim. But does plaintiff have a right to the federal forum by filing
there first? And upon losing the constitutional claim in state court,
should plaintiff be precluded from pursuing that claim in the federal
court where it remains stayed? The answer to both questions is yes,
plaintiff has a right to federal court access by filing there first. To
guarantee access to federal courts after a Pullman abstention, in 1964
the Supreme Court created the England reservation. It provides that
if Pullman abstention requires a party to resort to state courts, the
party may either submit all issues to the state court, or instead notify
the state court of the constitutional issue and reserve them for later
litigation in the stayed federal case, if necessary.2 °4 The Court's
language in England underscores the plaintiffs right to access to a
federal forum, "'When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a
case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such
jurisdiction ....
The right of a party plaintiff to choose20 5a Federal
is
court where there a choice cannot be properly denied.'
Some abstention doctrines-Burford, for example-allow
dismissal of the federal case with no possibility of returning to
federal court.2 °6 There is no denial of court access in these cases
because the declining of federal jurisdiction is premised on the
appropriateness of a state forum, and according to Burford, the
inappropriateness of the federal forum in some cases. Burford was a
federal diversity action seeking an injunction against the
enforcement of a Texas state agency decision regarding an oil
drilling permit. The oil permits were often contentiously litigated
and the applicable law had considerable discretion based on the
variety of geological and mineral ownership settings that might
occur. To avoid a haphazard development of precedent in a
complicated regulatory area, Texas had established a centralized
review system in the state court of appeals in Austin, a system which
204. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1964).
205. Id. at 415 (citing Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
206. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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had been undermined by litigants' forum shopping in federal
courts.207 The Supreme Court-with five votes-ruled that federal
courts should decline diversity jurisdiction in a matter involving a
complex area of state regulatory law with a centralized state-court
review system, and in doing so, paid little textual attention to any
presumption favoring the exercise of federal litigation. 208 The courtaccess argument was not ignored, however, and came in a stronglyworded dissent from Justice Frankfurter, joined by three others.20 9
Among other differences with the majority, Frankfurter argued that
"[t]he duty of the judiciary is to exercise the jurisdiction which
Congress has conferred. ' ' 2 1 As discussed later in this article, the
fact that Frankfurter's argument is couched in terms of separation of
powers should not compel the conclusion that it is a duty owed only
to Congress. 211 Although the Burford majority did not acknowledge
a presumption favoring the exercise of jurisdiction, since then the
Supreme 2 Court
has in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance
12
Company.

Two other abstention doctrines jointly restrict federal courts
from enjoining pending state litigation. The Younger/Pennzoil
doctrine requires that federal anti-suit injunctions against pending
state litigation satisfy strict equitable injunction standards, that is,
plaintiff must establish the three elements of bad faith, irreparable
harm, and no adequate remedy at law. 2 13 Addressing different
207. Id. at 317-30.
208. Id. at 331-34. This reasoning appears to confuse the difference between
threshold jurisdiction to hear the case and the discretion to deny injunctive relief.
That equity is discretionary on the merits does not mean that a lawsuit seeking an
equitable remedy must be discretionarily declined without consideration. Burford
may nonetheless be valid as an exercise of balancing the interests of federalism,
particularly in light of the trouble Texas had at the time with federal courts
rendering uneducated decisions about oil and gas regulation.
209. Id. at 336-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 348.
211. See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (claiming that the courtaccess argument is best explained using both the separation of powers argument
and the due process argument).
212. 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (noting that the Burford doctrine "only rarely
favors abstention").
213. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1 (1987) (discussing the application of Younger); see also CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., 17A FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 2d § 4255 (1988)
(discussing the contours of Younger).
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concerns in the same setting, the Anti-Injunction Act limits federal
anti-suit injunctions against pending state litigation to three narrow
exceptions: where injunctions are congressionally authorized, where
necessary in aid of the federal court's in-rem jurisdiction, and where
necessary to protect or enforce a federal court's final judgment.214
While the other abstention doctrines primarily protect state-federal
relations, both of these anti-injunction doctrines demonstrate the
irony of denying or restricting the use of a federal forum in order to
protect a party's prior access to a state forum, and the exceptions for
each come into play to protect another party's superior right to a
federal forum.
The act of state doctrine, sometimes labeled abstention,
permits a state or federal court to defer to the sovereign acts of
foreign governments done within their territories. It is better
described as a choice of law rule as the Supreme Court did in WS.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectronics Corp.
International.215 In Kirkpatrick, a losing bidder for a Nigerian
government contract sued the winning bidder, alleging bribery, to
which the defendant raised an act-of-state defense, that is, the money
paid to the Nigerian government was necessarily valid as part of a
sovereign act in awarding the contract. Rejecting the abstention
label and finding the act of state doctrine inapplicable for lack of a
sovereign act, the unanimous Court concluded with the strong
presumption favoring the exercise of jurisdiction:
The short of the matter is this: Courts in the United
States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation,
to decide cases and controversies properly presented
to them. The act of state doctrine does not establish
an exception for cases and controversies that may
embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires
that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign
214. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 1994). For cases applying this act, see
generally Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988) (applying
the Act to a wrongful death suit); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
630-31 (1977) (applying the Act in an antitrust suit); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 228-29 (1972) (discussing the Act in the context of a First and Fourteenth
Amendment cause of action); Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129-30
(1941) (applying the Act to insurance litigation); see generally CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, at § 4224 (discussing the Act).
215. 493 U.S. 400, 408 (1990).
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sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall
be deemed valid.216
c.

Declining Removed Cases and
Supplemental Claims

Removal and supplemental jurisdiction provide another
ground for federal courts to decline jurisdiction. Both jurisdictional
categories allow for the removal of non-federal claims (arising under
state or foreign law) lacking independent jurisdiction bases in federal
court; both have statutory grounds for remanding the dispute to state
court if all federal claims have been resolved, or if the state-law
issues predominate or are novel or complex.2 17 As with abstention,
these denials of a federal forum are based in every instance on the
availability and appropriateness of an alternative state forum. In a
larger perspective, removal and supplemental jurisdiction are
primary examples of the government fulfilling its duty to provide a
forum-a federal forum-for disputes with jurisdictionally-mixed
state and federal claims, and taking the extra step to ensure that the
federal forum is denied only in the few instances where a state forum
is more appropriate.
d.

Declining Casesfor Local Public
Policy Reasons

The cases discussed thus far in this section involve declining
jurisdiction in deference to another jurisdiction's interests. The
opposite scenario-favoring local interests--can also lead to the
suppression of litigation where the forum refuses to litigate
nonresidents' claims, or claims which violate local public policy.
Although such exclusions are valid in many cases, state courts (and
the state legislatures regulating them) are subject to the same courtaccess requirements as the federal government under due process,

216. Id. at 409.
217. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West 1993) (remand of supplemental claims); 28
U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (West 1994) (remand of separate and independent state law
claims); see Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (holding that a
federal district court has discretion under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to
remand to a state court).
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equal protection, and the right to petition.218 In addition to sharing
the requirements of the federal government, state courts are subject
to the privileges and immunities clause requiring them to treat
citizens of sister states as their own regarding court access, 21 9 by full
faith and credit requiring state courts to furnish a forum not only for
judgment-enforcement purp oses 220 but also to litigate claims arising
under sister states' laws,
and by the supremacy clause requiring
state courts to accept jurisdiction over federal law claims.
In
addition, forty states have constitutional provisions which equal or
223
exceed the federal doctrines discussed in this article.
e.

Supreme Court Declinationsof
OriginalJurisdiction

The Supreme Court has occasionally declined jurisdiction,
218. See supra notes 112-53, 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
basis of these requirements).
219. See supra notes 121, 122, 136 and accompanying text (surveying the
origin of the application of court-access requirements to the states).
220. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 (1908) (stating that at least
two states have attempted to block a repugnant sister-state judgment by claiming to
lack a competent court and that these attempts fell to Full Faith and Credit); see
also Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411
(1920) (same). States must honor final judgments from sister states even if
rendered on matters illegal in the enforcing state, Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 233, or
contrary to the enforcing state's public policy, Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S. 222, 233-35 (1998), although states may reject sister-state judgments
interfering with matters under the enforcing state's exclusive control. See Baker,
522 U.S. at 233-35 (denying enforcement of a Michigan injunction attempting to
stop defendant's employee from testifying in a Missouri lawsuit).
221. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1951) (holding that a
Wisconsin wrongful death statute, which limited remedies to deaths occurring in
Wisconsin, was unconstitutional when construed to deny jurisdiction to claim for
death in Illinois).
222. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947).
223. Phillips, supra note 109, at 1310 n.6. The Texas Constitution provides
that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX.
CONST., art. 1, § 13. Precedent has clarified section 13's access-to-court guaranty:
"It is therefore not to be doubted that the legislature is without the power to deny
the citizen the right to resort to the courts for the redress of any intentional injury
to his person by another. Such a cause of action.., could not be taken away; nor
could the use of the courts for its enforcement be destroyed." Middleton v. Tex.
Power & Light Co., 185 S.W. 556 (Tex. 1916).
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sometimes in deference to lower courts having concurrent
jurisdiction, and in rare instances where no other courts existed
because of the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corporationis a leading example of declining
concurrent original jurisdiction.22 4 Wyandotte concerned an Ohio
nuisance-abatement complaint regarding Wyandotte and other
companies who were dumping mercury into Lake Erie. 22 5 The Court
noted its obvious jurisdiction, based on the claim by a State against
corporations from other states and Canada,226 before declining on the
grounds that the issue was complex and required the expertise of
fact-finding bodies--courts and agencies-that the Supreme Court
could not well provide within its experience as a mostly appellate
review court. But the Court did not lightly decline the case, even
though its jurisdiction was concurrent with lower courts. Rather, the
Court began with the "time-honored maxim of the Anglo-American
common-law tradition that a court possessed of jurisdiction generally
must exercise it."' 227 The Court then developed a two-part test for
declining its original/concurrent jurisdiction:
(1) declination of jurisdiction would not disserve any
of the principal policies underlying the Article III
jurisdictional grant and (2) the reasons of practical
wisdom that persuade us that this Court is an
inappropriate forum are consistent with the
proposition that our discretion is legitimated by its use
to keep this aspect of this228Court's functions attuned to
its other responsibilities.

224. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
225. Id. at 494.
226. The Court's original jurisdiction came from 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)
authorizing concurrent original jurisdiction over "all actions or proceedings by a
State against the citizens of another State or aliens." The defendant corporations
were from Michigan, Delaware, and Canada. Id. at 494-95.
227. Id. at 496-97 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821));
see supra note 191 and accompanying text regarding Cohens.
228. Id. at 499; see also Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (stating
that the Court had original, but not exclusive jurisdiction in actions between a state
and citizens of another state); Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109,
113 (1972) (stating that original jurisdiction allows for discretion over cases);
United States v. Nevada & California, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973) (stating that the
Court seeks to use original jurisdiction sparingly).
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Wyandotte declines jurisdiction for neither inconvenient forum nor
parallel litigation reasons, but the principle of efficiency is similar.
As with the other two, plaintiffs were merely2 29
denied their forum of
absolute.
the
in
forum
a
denied
choice, but not
The Court's declinations of exclusive original jurisdictionlimited to controversies between States23°-are more provoking at
first blush but are justified on the facts. In most instances,
alternative forums were available in parallel actions not involving all
the state parties. In Arizona v. New Mexico, for example, the Court
declined exclusive jurisdiction in an interstate tax case based on
identical issues raised in a parallel case still in litigation in a lower
court. 23 1 It did the same in Louisiana v. Mississippi, a state
boundary case having issues identical to those in parallel private
litigation in lower courts, where the states were somewhat nominal
parties. 21 California v. West Virginia may be more difficult to
justify legally but is nonetheless a sensible rejection of
jurisdiction.233 The action arose from a contract dispute regarding
"athletic contests between two state universities." 234 Without
opinion, the Court denied leave to file the original complaint. Justice
Stevens dissented and pointed out that even though the states' failure
to resolve this "does not speak well for the statesmanship of either
party," it did not justify the rejection of the Court's exclusive
jurisdiction in a breach of contract claim.2 35 As to both sets of
jurisdictional refusals-concurrent and exclusive-scholars have
various opinions. 236 But whether the Supreme Court is justified in
these declinations or not, it is important to note that in all these
examples, California v. West Virginia is the only case in which the
parties might be left without a forum, and even there it is likely that
229. See also United States v. Alabama, 382 U.S. 897, 897 (1965) (declining
jurisdiction because of a parallel case with different parties raising identical
questions concerning voting rights).
230. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 1993). Other than states suing states, all
other instances of Supreme Court original jurisdiction are concurrent. See id. at §
1251(b).
231. 425 U.S. 794 (1976).

232. 488 U.S. 990 (1988).
233. 454 U.S. 1027 (1981).
234. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id.

236. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 111, at 299-304 (discussing
declination ofjurisdiction in Supreme Court cases).
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the universities could bring local actions without involving the states.
f

Alternative DoctrinalSourcesfor
Forum Declinations-Separationof
Powers and other Overlays of Due
Process

In this section, discussing the court's duty to exercise its
jurisdiction, case law establishes the duty as one owed to plaintiff
based on due process and other constitutional and common law
doctrines. Some cases, along with scholarly analysis, have argued
for the same duty but attributed it to separation of powers, thus
creating a duty the courts owe to Congress. Professor Redish, for
example, has argued that the judge-made abstention doctrinesPullman, Burford, Colorado River-are an unconstitutional
usurpation of Congress's legislative role in deciding how and by
whom federal laws will be implemented and enforced.237 Professor
Shapiro has responded that within the Anglo-American structure,
jurisdictional grants include an inherent discretion to decline
jurisdiction in any number of settings, including those covered by
Pullman, Burford, and Colorado River. 238 Redish thus argues that
the duty to exercise jurisdiction flows from the legislative
authorization and that declining jurisdiction puts the court in an
inappropriate policy-making role,239 while Shapiro argues that
jurisdiction is power but not duty, to be exercised with reasonable
discretion. 24 My criticism of the arguments by Professors Redish
and Shapiro may be misplaced because neither had in mind the
question I am posing-may Congress economically impair the
federal courts and still retain its full authority to regulate
jurisdiction? My rebuttal is nonetheless necessary because of both
articles' persuasive and well-documented discussion of discretionary
abstention, a phenomenon in which basic court access was not at
issue. The Redish/Shapiro discussion was whether the plaintiff
should be in state or federal court, not whether plaintiff could be in
court at all, a question raising different concerns and different
237. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
JudicialFunction,94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984).
238. Shapiro, supra note 191, at 544-45.
239. Redish, supra note 237, at 114-15.
240. Shapiro, supra note 191, at 588-89.
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doctrinal sources.
Separation of powers is no doubt at issue when a federal
judge declines otherwise valid jurisdiction in, for example, a civil
rights case. On this point, either Redish (favoring federal litigation)
or Shapiro (favoring discretionary abstention) may be correct
depending on how one defines the court's authority to make policy
when federalism clashes with separation of powers. But however
appropriate it is to assess Pullman in light of separation of powers, to
leave the discussion there misses a significant point. The President
and Congress have significant discretion in exercising their
respective jurisdictions. The President has a primary power over
foreign policy but wide discretion in using it. Congress may regulate
interstate commerce but has discretion as to the breadth and content
of its regulations. Courts are different. Although judges have
discretion in any number of their functions, they have very little
discretion in choosing to exercise or decline jurisdiction, limited to
the narrow exceptions explained in this article, which generally
involve the availability of another forum. What explains the
difference between the widely discretionary exercise of executive
and legislative jurisdiction on the one hand, and the strong
presumption favoring the exercise of judicial jurisdiction on the
other? The answer is due process, not only from the Constitution,
but from English common law with lineage back to Runymede and
American judicial language reinforcing the doctrine for over two
hundred years. 24 1 Separation of powers compels the courts to heed
jurisdictional boundaries set by Congress. But separation of powers
does not, by itself, compel any duty to exercise jurisdiction in any
given case any more than the Constitution's Article I compels
241. The D.C. Circuit illustrated this link between separation of powers and
due process in a case upholding judicial review of a Social Security benefit denial:
In our view, a statutory provision precluding all judicial review of
constitutional issues removes from the courts as an essential function
under our implied constitutional mandate of separation of powers, and
deprives an individual of an independent forum for the adjudication of a
claim of constitutional right. We have little doubt that such a 'limitation
on the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts to review the
constitutionality of federal legislation.., would be [an] unconstitutional'
infringement of due process.
Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alteration in original)
(quoting Redish, supra note 119, at 27).
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Congress to exercise all jurisdiction granted there. Due process does
compel courts to act, subject to exceptions as described in this
article.
It is hardly surprising that scholarly analysis of the courtaccess duty has focused on doctrines such as separation of powers
and bypassed due process. 242 Due process is unlikely to be
implicated where a federal court abstains in deference to a state
court. Even with occasional examples of jurisdiction-stripping
federal statutes, 243 few fact settings over the last two American
centuries have raised court-access issues on the level that the current
funding shortages may soon do. Court access for rank-and-file
litigants in American courts has not been a due process issue 244 other
than for disenfranchised groups (even due process has a far-fromperfect history) and in isolated cases raising the exceptions discussed
here.

242. Professor Wright noted briefly that "the judicial experience under the
Portal-to-Portal Act, as well as more recent lower court decisions, suggests that
there may be some limitations on congressional power to restrict federal court
jurisdiction arising out of other portions of the Constitution, such as the Due
Process Clause and the First Amendment." CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3526, at 238-39 (1984) (citations to due
process and first amendment cases omitted). Alexander Bickel paid similar lip
service to the idea of a right to court access. In discussing the Supreme Court's
selective exercise of its jurisdiction, Bickel compared the Court to courts of
general jurisdiction, noting that state courts "must, indeed, resolve all
controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative is chaos."
ALEXANDER

M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 173 (2d ed. 1986). The

alternative also violates due process.
In an analysis limited to Congress's jurisdiction-stripping bills for such issues
as abortion, Professor Brilmayer argued that Congress has a duty to furnish a
federal forum for constitutional claims based on the comity inherent in federalism
and principles of conflicts law, relying on analogous forum-furnishing duties
imposed by full faith and credit (interstate) and the supremacy clause
(state/federal). See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 120 passim.
243. See infra notes 245-80 and accompanying text (discussing these statutes
in more detail).
244. Professor Shapiro cites Justices Marshall (in Cohens v. Virginia) and
Brennan (in Moses, Cohens, and Colorado River) as mistakenly describing a
strong duty for courts to exercise jurisdiction. Shapiro, supra note 191, at 543-44,
588 ("[T]he responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and
should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in
matters relating to federal jurisdiction."); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 111,
at 72-73 (discussing the rise of discretion by the court).
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The Legislature's Duty to Furnish a Forum

In spite of these cases' addressing the judiciary's duty to
exercise jurisdiction, the duty does not flow from the judiciary as
such, but from the government's duty to furnish a forum. Along
with Professor Hart's iconic dialogue,2" 5 a number of cases offer
insight into Congress and state legislatures' attempt to limit judicial
review. The starting point once again is Marbury v. Madison, a
dispute initially between the hopeful appointee Marbury and
incoming President Jefferson. 2 46 It quickly degenerated into a
showdown between Chief Justice Marshall and Congress, which
repealed the Circuit Court Act of 1801 and then impeached (but
failed to convict) Justice Chase. 24 Marshall and judicial review
won.

Two Reconstruction cases provide a foundation for
constitutional constraints on Congress's power to limit the judiciary.
Both were habeas cases, and as with Marbury, the Court's holding
was limited to jurisdictional issues. But as with Marbury, the
concepts of the right of court access and the government's duty to
furnish it could not have been more central to the jurisdictional
issues being considered. Congress won a round in Ex parte
McCardle's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.2 48 The dismissal was
based on Congress's having repealed the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction to review the 1867 habeas statute under which McCardle
had filed, the repeal occurring during the pendency of McCardle's
case in Congress's effort to keep the southern newspaper editor in
The Court held
jail for writing against Reconstruction. 249
specifically that Congress had the power to regulate and thus limit
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but further held that the
Court retained appellate jurisdiction over habeas petitions other than
those brought under the 1867 Act. 250
In the same Supreme Court term, Ex parte Yerger25 '
245. See Hart, supra note 119 (discussing the legislature's duty to furnish a
forum).
246. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
247. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 11-15; Chemow, supra note

20.
248. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).

249. Id. at 508-09.
250. Id. at 514-15.
251. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
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reinforced this presumption favoring jurisdiction. Yerger was
accused of murder and though he was a civilian, was in the custody
of the Army and faced non-jury trial in a military tribunal. Unlike
25 2
McCardle, Yerger filed his habeas petition under earlier statutes.
After the federal circuit court in Mississippi denied his petition,
Yerger was in the same position as McCardle, needing a writ of
habeas corpus from the Supreme Court, albeit one issued in appellate
review. The Court confirmed McCardle's holding that the 1868 Act
repealing the Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas petitions
under the 1867 Act did not affect review of petitions under prior
habeas statutes.253 Yerger could have been limited to an exercise of
statutory interpretation-finding as it did that the 1868 repeal was
limited to its express language-but the Court took care to
emphasize that to hold otherwise would mean that Congress could
repeal "the whole appellate jurisdiction of this Court, in cases of
habeas corpus, conferred by the Constitution, recognized by law, and
exercised from the foundation of the government .. ,2 This is
not to say that Congress lacks the power to regulate the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. It is to say that the Court will not
relinquish such jurisdiction absent Congress's clear intent,255 a
position based in part on Yerger's right to a forum. Tracing the writ
from England's Habeas Corpus Act of Mary 27, 1679, through its
adoption in the American Constitution, the Court noted that "[t]he
terms of this provision necessarily imply judicial action. In England,
all the higher courts were open to applicants for the writ, and it is
hardly supposable that, under the new [United States] government,
founded on more liberal ideas and principles, any court would be,
intentionally, closed to them., 25
Additional right-of-access
language appears in the Court's observation that in cases like
Yerger's, where the writ has been refused by a lower court and must
come from an appellate court, "however unlawful his imprisonment
may be in fact, is wholly without remedy unless it be found in the

252. Id. at 86-88.
253. Id. at 105.
254. Id. at 106.
255. Id.
256. Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 95-96. For readers, especially nonlawyers, who may find grounds for rejection in the phrase "founded on more
liberal principles," the Court necessarily meant libertarian principles as opposed to
any New Deal meaning.
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appellate jurisdiction of this court. 2 5 7
Most cases directly addressing Congress's forum-furnishing
duty fall under due process. They arise in multiple fact settings for
various underlying injuries, but rather than explaining them
topically, the doctrine's evolution is best expressed chronologically.
In the landmark Yakus v. United States, 258 the Supreme Court upheld
a federal law which limited review of criminal convictions under
wartime price-control laws to an administrative tribunal, with
appellate review in the Supreme Court. In holding that Congress
was not required to provide original jurisdiction in an Article III
court, the Court held that "[t]here is no constitutional requirement
that that test be made in one tribunal rather than in another, so long
as there is an opportunity to be heard and for judicial review which
satisfies the demands of due process.,

259

Battaglia v. General

26

Motors Corporation was a claim challenging the constitutionality
of Congress's repeal of plaintiffs rights to overtime pay. Plaintiffs
ultimately lost on the merits, but in responding to defendant General
Motors's argument that Congress also removed the court's ability to
review the constitutionality of this repeal, the court found that:
the exercise by Congress of its control over
jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say,
while Congress has the undoubted power to give,
withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other
than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that
power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or1 to take private
26
property without just compensation.
A German prisoner of war filed a habeas corpus petition in
Eisentragerv. Forrestal.262 The district court dismissed for lack of
257. Id. at 103.
258. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
259. Id. at 444.
260. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
261. Id. at 257 (citations omitted).
262. 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
opinion in Eisentrager held that because state courts lacked jurisdiction over
habeas claims for federal prisoners, Congress could not divest federal courts-and
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subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Congress had not included
claims by prisoners held outside the United States in the habeas
statute. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Constitution
forbids Congress from withholding a federal forum for habeas
corpus for federal prisoners. 263 In reaching its conclusion, the court
considered the argument that a lower federal court's power was
limited to that granted by Congress, and then narrowed the
hypothesis to Congress's omitting jurisdiction over a constitutional
claim regarding federal confinement. Because state courts lack
power to review federal confinement, to conclude that Congress
could strip the power from lower federal courts would be to say that
Congress could legislate "outside the necessity for compliance with
the Constitution." 264
More recently the Court has held that
Congress's elimination of judicial review of administrative bail
denials for immigrants facing deportation (where the immigrant had
been held for six months with no hearing), did not eliminate a due
process review or the Court's power to grant habeas relief in lieu of
65
bail.

2

In a McCarthy-era opinion analyzed under the standing
doctrine-addressing an organization's right to object to being
thus all courts-from such claims. The holding, though reversed on other grounds,
is not all that controversial, but the case's dictum regarding Congress's power in
vesting the courts with the broadest range of Article III power is sometimes read as
the largest extension of judicial power since Justice Story's notion that Congress
was required to vest the courts with all power authorized by Article III. JAMES W.
MOORE, ET AL., 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 100.20 n.16 (Martin Redish
ed., 3d ed. 2005); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 36, at 47.
The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of territorial restrictions in the
Constitution's reach-that whatever Congress's power might be as to restricting
habeas corpus review, the Constitution's guarantees (due process and habeas in
particular) did not extend to enemy aliens alleged to have committed war crimes
outside the United States territory, and who were at all times detained outside U.S.
territory. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 776-91. In spite of denying plaintiffs a forum
for their habeas claims, Johnson v. Eisentragerhas some of American law's best
arguments for the right of access to court for parties who are not enemy aliens held
abroad. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text (underscoring the right of
access to the courts for most parties and limiting the rule against suits by resident
alien enemies to suits that might hamper the war effort).
263. Eisentrager,174 F.2d at 967.
264. Id. at 966.
265. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003) (granting
habeas relief and listing other cases discussing limits on Congress's power to limit
judicial review of administrative decisions).
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labeled a communist in an ad hoc procedure by the Justice
Department-Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion drew heavily
from the Brinkerhoff-Faris case in which the Supreme Court
required Missouri to open its state courts to an action against a local
tax.266 Specifically, Frankfurter quoted that "[w]hether acting
through its judiciary or its legislature, a State may not deprive a
person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which
the State has no power to destroy, unless26there
is, or was, afforded to
7
it."
protect
to
opportunity
him some real
Two cases involving Selective Service challenges raised the
forum availability question during the Vietnam War. In Petersen v.
Clark,268 plaintiff sued to enjoin induction into the military and the
government objected on the grounds that federal law barred judicial
review of a Selective Service decision. 269 The district court found
the jurisdiction-stripping statute unconstitutional, citing authority
that due process is a limitation on Congress's power to regulate
federal jurisdiction. 270 More complicated facts arose in Murray v.
Vaughn,271 in which Murray was expelled from the Peace Corps for
publishing an editorial against the Vietnam War while at his assigned
location in Chile. He then was reclassified by Selective Service and
drafted; he sued for injunctive relief to bar the draft, and for
reinstatement in the Peace Corps to maintain his prior draft
deferment. The government objected to the federal district court's
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Murray's claim did
not satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, arguing that his
missing Peace Corps benefits were the only quantifiable claim. The
court rejected this characterization both as to how to quantify his
losses, 2 72 and, pertinent to this article, because Murray's First
Amendment claim would go without a forum if the $10,000 amount

266. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-62
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 162 (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673, 682 (1930)).
268. 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
269. Id. at 701-02 (discussing 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3)).
270. Id. at 705 ("Congress surely cannot dilute or abrogate existing
constitutional guarantees in the guise of exercising its authority to vest, withhold
or restrict the judicial power of inferior courts.").
271. 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969).
272. Id. at 694-95.
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were deemed to disqualify it. 273 The court found authority not only
in due process but in Article III as well:
Both the Fifth Amendment and Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution might well be abused if no avenue is
opened for review by the courts of that claim.
Specifically, if there is an arguably valid
constitutional claim here, and if, as the government
contends, neither 28 U.S.C. § 1361 mandamus nor 28
U.S.C. § 1331 general equity jurisdiction is available,
how can the plaintiff seek to vindicate his rights?
Certainly, the concurrent jurisdiction of the state
In
courts is highly questionable in this context ....
summation, it is probable that if § 1331's amount in
controversy proviso bars this court from reaching the
merits of this case, a plaintiff, who alleges injury to
those rights which occupy the highest position in the
pantheon of our constitutional values, would be left
without judicial process of law. As so applied, § 1331
might well be deemed to violate both the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment and Article III, § 2 of
the Constitution insofar as it establishes the judicial
branch of the government.274
In 1986, the Supreme Court dodged a "serious constitutional
question" in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians by
interpreting a federal statute as not precluding judicial review of
certain Medicare payments to doctors. 275 The D.C. Circuit avoided a
similar issue in Bartlett v. Bowen, when the court considered a law
that arguably barred judicial review of a Social Security
determination regarding extended care payments to Christian

273. Id. at 694-96. At the time, general federal questions raised under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 had the same amount-in-controversy threshold as diversity claims,
limiting federal courts to claims exceeding $10,000. State courts were ordinarily
available to hear concurrent federal question claims with lesser value, but state
courts lacked jurisdiction to review the challenged actions by the Peace Corps and
Selective Service, and without the federal court, Murray's claim would have no
forum.
274. Id. at 695 (citations omitted).
275. 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986).
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Science facilities. 276 The Bartlett court held that any statutory
construction that precluded review would violate both separation of
powers 277 and due process, 278 and drew authority from several
scholars including Professor Redish's point that "'to the extent that
the provisions of Article III are inconsistent with the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, those provisions of Article III must be
considered modified by the amendment.' 279 The Bartlett opinion
further quoted Professor Ratner:
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the
[Constitutional] Convention gave Congress the
authority to specify . . . orderly procedures and to

modify the jurisdiction from time to time in response
to prevailing social and political requirements, within
the limits imposed by the Court's essential
constitutional role. It is not reasonable to conclude
that the Convention gave Congress the power to
destroy that role. Reasonably interpreted the clause
means "With such exceptions and under such
regulations as Congress may make, not inconsistent
of the Supreme Court
with the essential functions
2 80
under this Constitution.,

Congress is not alone in having federal constitutional limits
276. 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
277. Id. at 703 ("Because the Secretary has no authority to consider
constitutional questions, the appellant would have no forum at all for the pursuit of
her claims. We would thus be faced with a situation in which Congress has
enacted legislation and simultaneously declared that legislation to be immune from
any constitutional challenge by the plaintiff.").
278. Id. at 706 (quoting Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal
Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895,
921 n. 113 (1984), and stating that "[h]owever, '[s]ince restrictions on federal
courts ordinarily leave state courts as available forums, curtailments of federal
jurisdiction do not typically require confrontation of the difficult and unsettled
problem of access to some judicial forum.' In other words, courts and legal
scholars routinely assume that there is a due process right to have the scope of
constitutional rights determined by some independent judicial body-and the
Supreme Court has never held or hinted otherwise.").
279. Id. at 706 (quoting Redish, supra note 119, at 25).
280. Id. (quoting Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 171-72 (1960)).
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on its power over access to courts. State legislatures (and state
courts applying state laws to bar court access) have met similar fates
in attempts to limit judicial review. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
Savings Co. v. Hill is the best example. 2 8' Plaintiff, a bank, sued to
stop local Missouri tax assessments as discriminatory, but the state
court dismissed the lawsuit-an equity claim-because the bank had
not exhausted its administrative remedies by complaining first to the
state tax commission. 282 The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal and expressly affirmed the exhaustion requirement, even
though its own precedent held that the commission lacked
adjudicatory power. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the practical effect of the judgment of the Missouri
court is to deprive the plaintiff of property without affording it at any
time an opportunity to be heard in its defense. 283 As to the
argument that this was entirely a Missouri question and did not
involve federal or constitutional law, the Court noted:
[W]hile it is for the state courts to determine the
adjective as well as the substantive law of the state,
they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process
of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or
through its legislature, a State may not deprive a
person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of
a right, which the State has no power to destroy,
unless there is, or was,284afforded to him some real
opportunity to protect it.
In Brinkerhoff, Missouri's bar to judicial review was court-created
but was in the court's construction of a state statute. The case thus
illustrates the wide applicability of the right to court access, first in
its express application of a court-access right to both Missouri's
courts and its legislature, and second, in its use as precedent for
purely federal cases. 285
State legislatures have also found
281. 281 U.S. 673 (1930).

282. Id. at 674.
283. Id. at 678.
284. Id. at 682 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
285. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] state may not deprive a person of all
existing remedies for the enforcement of a right ...unless there is or was afforded
to him some real opportunity to protect it." (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
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constitutional barriers-either state or federal-to statutes requiring
courts to grant legislative continuances for attorney-legislators.
Bars to judicial review are not the only means of legislatures
impairing the judicial forum, but are the most litigated examples of
inappropriate limits. Other examples of litigation bars include longarm jurisdiction restrictions, subject matter jurisdiction rules, venue
and inconvenient forum rules, and statutes of limitation. 28 All are
presumptively valid but may encounter constitutional problems if
unreasonably short or restrictive. More telling is the court-access
impairment arising from legislative budget cutting, which is not
susceptible to judicial review in the federal system and likely not in
most state systems. But, the unavailability of a judicial remedy for
underfunding the courts does not compel the conclusion that
legislatures are free to shirk their duty to furnish courts, as further
illustrated in this article.
3.

The Executive's Duty and the Foreign Policy
Commitment to Court Access

The quick answer to questions regarding the executive
branch's duty of court access is that King John accepted it at
Runymede 288 and President Jefferson re-learned it in Marbury v.
Madison.289 Quick answers often fall short, as this one does, but it is
true that the original common-law commitment to court availability
was imposed directly on the executive, albeit a king who also
Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930))).
286. See Thurmond v. Superior Court, 427 P.2d 985, 987 (Cal. 1967) (noting
that the legislature could not have intended "the serious constitutional question
which would ensue" if child support hearing were postponed); A.B.C. Bus. Forms,
Inc. v. Spaet, 201 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1967) ("As a right guaranteed by the
Constitution, the courts must be open to every person for relief against injury.");
Bishop v. Montante, 237 N.W.2d 465, 467 (1976) (discussing in dictum due
process violation for unreasonably long periods of legislative postponements);
Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. 1977) (stating that it is a violation
of due process to postpone action regarding child support).
287. See supra note 140 (discussing statutes of limitation).
288. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (explaining that in
signing the Magna Carta, King John agreed to provisions allowing greater access
to the courts).
289. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (stating that even though the Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction for an original grant of mandamus, Marshall's reasoning
set the cornerstone for judicial review and the right to a remedy).
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exercised legislative and judicial functions. Of course, King John's
acceptance is merely heritage, as is the Magna Carta's commitment
to due process.
Under the United States Constitution, the president's direct
interaction with the judiciary is limited to federal judicial
appointments and veto power over the budget, 290 even though the
president has great indirect power in lobbying Congress on a variety
of issues including the judiciary's budget and the jurisdiction and
venue statutes discussed in this article. Under the Constitution,
however, Congress has the far greater control over the federal
judiciary and the president's opportunity to deny access to courts is
limited. Nonetheless, it has happened. Andrew Jackson's statement
regarding Worcester v. Georgia2 91 that "John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it" had the effect of denying the forum
by denying enforcement of its judgment.292 Because enforcement
jurisdiction is an executive power, arguably President Jackson was
within his rights. On the other hand, the statement has never been
verified,293 perhaps because Jackson was unwilling to affirm later
what he had said privately. In any event, Jackson's ignoring of the
judgment ordering the release of missionaries who broke Georgia
law by living with Cherokees was mooted by the Georgia governor's
pardoning them 294 and Jackson's view of judgment enforcement
went untested.
Thirteen days after the fall of Fort Sumter and fearing
insurrection in the volatile area around the Capitol, President Lincoln
authorized Commanding General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus in an area between Philadelphia and Washington,
D.C. 29 1 In 1862, Lincoln formalized this with his infamous
290. See supra notes 38, 43 (discussing, respectively, presidential
appointment and the veto power).
291. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
292. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 25 (discussing Jackson's
statements and their effects).
293. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 25 ("There is a legend that
....
"); see also KERMIT HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 289 (3d ed.
2005) (referring to Jackson as having "supposedly" made the statement); ALVIN
M. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATIONS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN

INDIANS 328 (1994) (describing the statement as "legend").
294. KILLIAN & COSTELLO, supra note 2, at 795.

295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that Congress may suspend habeas
corpus "in cases of Rebellion or Invasion" if required for public safety); see
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, at 365 (noting that the president has no such power); see
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Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus, used
immediately to imprison several citizens accused of activities
This went
ranging from sabotage to seditious speeches. 296
unchallenged in some detentions without trial, including that of
Congressman Vallandigham from Ohio, but was rebuked in Ex parte
Merryman where Chief Justice Taney (in a lower court while riding
circuit) ruled that Maryland Congressman John Merryman's
was
without
trial
by
military
authorities
detention
unconstitutional.297 Lincoln later had Congress ratify his suspension
of the writ, but was again rebuked after the war in Ex parteMilligan
when the Supreme Court ruled that even with congressional
approval, Milligan's conviction by a military tribunal was
unconstitutional and should have been done in an Article III court.298
At the outset of World War II, the Supreme Court seemed to back
away from Milligan in Ex parte Quirin, at least as to foreign
defendants, in upholding the military-tribunal conviction and death
sentence of a small group of German saboteurs who had landed on
American shores. 2 99 The current Court recently reaffirmed the right
to habeas in an Article III court for Guantanamo detainees captured
in Afghanistan, 300 and again as to a United States citizen captured
there. 3° 1 In all these cases of habeas suspensions, defendants were
detained under orders of the Executive branch. In the most recent
cases following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
had authorized President Bush "to use all necessary and appropriate
force" 302 but stopped short of delegating other Article I powers such
also ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 18591865, at 237 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
296. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 365 (noting that among
President Lincoln's actions after taking office in 1861 was his unilateral
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).
297. 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861); see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra
note 36, at 365 (discussing Exparte Merryman).
298. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
299. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950) (upholding the military-tribunal convictions, held in
Germany, of German civilians captured in the Pacific theater and convicted as
enemy-aliens).
300. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004) (holding that
the district court has jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges of Guantanamo
detainees).
301. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004).
302. Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
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as the suspension of habeas corpus.
Assuming that Quirin retains its force-that is, that
foreigners captured in the United States during wartime and accused
of sabotage can be convicted by a secret military tribunal-it is
nonetheless clear that a strong presumption favors not only the right
of habeas corpus, but the right to assert it in an Article III court.
How much further this principle extends as to the president in nonhabeas claims is only speculative. But as discussed earlier in this
article, agents of the executive branch, state and federal, are subject
relief and damage awards for interfering with court
both to 30injunctive
3
access.

One notable executive interference with the judiciaryFranklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan-was an attempt to stack
votes in the Supreme Court to ensure favorable judicial review for
New Deal reforms. 30 4 Undoubtedly an interference that exceeds
other presidents' traditional attempts to appoint litmus-satisfactory
justices, Roosevelt's plan nonetheless affirmed the importance of
court access by trying to load the Court rather than circumvent or
stifle adjudication.
Even if Roosevelt's attempts cannot be labeled as supportive
of the judicial function, actions by some American presidents can be
best illustrated by the expansion of court-access rights in
international matters. The rise of civil and political rights in the 20th
century included a number of treaties establishing, among other
rights, the right to a forum not only for criminal defense but for
certain civil claims specific to each treaty. These include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 5 the International

No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001); see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra
note 36, at 370 (discussing the Joint Resolution).
303. See discussion supra notes 121-76 and accompanying text (explaining
the Constitutional requirements and remedies for court access).
304. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-162

(1995) (discussing Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
305. G.A. Res. 217A (III), arts. 8, 10, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)
(providing, respectively, that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law" and that "[e]veryone is entitled in full equality
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charges against
him.").
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 30 6 the Protocol to the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 30 7 the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 30 8 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

306. Article 3 provides that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that
any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure
that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his rights thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; (c)
To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 3, openedfor signature
Oct. 5, 1977, S. Exec. Doc. No. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (signed by the United
States on Oct. 5, 1977, ratified on June 8, 1992, and entered into force on Sept. 8,
1992).
307. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees incorporates Articles 2
through 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(1), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for U.S., Nov. 1, 1968). Article
16(1)-(3) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that:
(1) A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of
all Contracting States;
(2) A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his
habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining
to access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from
cautio judicatum solvi; and
(3) A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 1
in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the
treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.
Id.
308. Article 3 provides that:
State's Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective
protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and
other state institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which
violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this
Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and
adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of
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of Discrimination Against Women, 30 9 the American Convention on
Human Rights, 3 10 and the Convention for the Protection of Human
31
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 1

such discrimination.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 3, openedfor signatureMarch 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2,
at 3 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; for United
States Nov. 20, 1994).
309. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 2(c), July 17, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981) (providing that "[t]o establish legal protection of the rights of women on an
equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other
public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of
discrimination").
310. Article 25 provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against
acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or
laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such
violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of
their official duties.
(2) The States Parties undertake:
(a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his
rights thereto determined by the competent authority provided for by
the legal system of the state;
(b) to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; and
(c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 25 (1)-(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
311. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
(providing in Article 6 (Right to a Fair Trial) that "In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law .... ).
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THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-IMPAIRED FORUM AND PLAINTIFFS'
RIGHT TO LITIGATE IN STATE COURTS

A.

The Forum-FurnishingDuty Applied to Budget Cuts

The duty to exercise jurisdiction-Colorado River's
unflagging obligation-is not merely a judicial duty but derives from
a governmental duty to furnish a forum. Dating back to the barons'
confrontation with King John in 1215, Anglo-American rights have
included the government's duty to provide court access for the
resolution of public and private disputes, a duty that continues in our
own Constitutional history and interpretive case law 312 and now
appears intreaties affirming the right of access to courts. The right
is not absolute. It is subject to limits and exceptions and like other
areas of law, sometimes has vague boundaries. In spite of those
limits, exceptions, and vagaries, the right of court access is
fundamental and at some basic point, non-derogable. It is a legal
constant whose exceptions are based on ameliorating factors such as
the existence of an alternative forum, a plaintiff's error in petitioning
the wrong court, or in a delay that prejudiced the opposing party.
The duty is imposed not only on governmental functionaries whose
actions might require judicial review, but on government actors who
impede court access. The duty applies to singular entities like King
John and to each branch in a tripartite structure like the United States
government.
Going back to the nation's founding, the United States has
312. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very

essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection."); Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) ("The right to sue and defend in the courts is the

alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other
rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government."); Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[W]hile Congress has the
undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than
the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property
without just compensation."); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir.
1983) (citing McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1972)) ("Of what avail
is it to the individual to arm him with a panoply of constitutional rights if, when he
seeks to vindicate them, the courtroom can be hermetically sealed against him...
.11).
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faced court-access crises with governmental actors denying or
attempting to deny a forum. But where ultimate court access was at
issue, access won. The few instances where access lost were shortlived and stand out as exceptions underscoring the rule. Until
recently, forum-denial crises had not been caused by systematic short
funding. Although court funding is a recurring problem in
government administration, the issue has been one of management
difficulty and short-term docket delays until the 1970s and 80s.
Budgeting is now in the crisis stage and court access is threatened,
particularly for civil cases.
In implementing austere operating budgets and conducting
studies to find further efficiencies, the judiciary has acted in the best
of faith even while declaring its crisis. 3 13 Vital court functions are
now impaired and in some districts, some functions are ending. At
the same moment that vital functions are in jeopardy, Congress is
crowding the courts with more cases and more categories of cases,
using preemption to federalize former state law matters, and
requiring minimal diversity to qualify many of the largest state court
actions for federal jurisdiction. Increasing numbers of state-court
plaintiffs will be forced into federal court by Congress's
"astonishing" and ongoing expansion in the regulation of former
314
state-law rights and the expansion of federal court jurisdiction.
Preemption and removal are not inherently unfair, but will become
unfair when the plaintiff s lawsuit languishes in federal court.
The duty to furnish a forum compels the conclusion that if
Congress eliminated lower federal courts, as it has the power to do,
its power to regulate lower federal court jurisdiction would be
ineffective and the statutes would become dormant until the courts
re-opened. Litigation would then be in state courts with appellate
review of constitutional and certain federal questions by the Supreme
Court.31 5 But is full closure required to trigger this default to state
313. See Judiciary Asks Congress to Ease Financial Hardships of Courts,
News
Release,
Admin.
Off.
U.S.
Courts,
April
12,
2005,
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/index.html (quoting Judge Julia Gibbons
as stating, "At the present time, the judiciary is in a most difficult and paradoxical
situation."); see also supra notes 17, 21-27, 29-31, 33-34 and accompanying text
(supporting the general proposition that the judiciary has acted with the best of
faith while declaring its crisis).
314. See supra note 82 (arguing that the amount of criminalized citizen
behavior has increased "in astonishing proportion" over the past few decades).
315. See Hart, supra note 119, at 1362-64 (discussing the argument that
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courts? If the right of court access is a limit on Congress's power to
eliminate the federal courts, then the duty is surely implicated at
some point well short of total elimination. The Constitution requires
Congress to pay the judges,316 and Congress requires the judiciary to
pay rent which is set unilaterally by the landlord-executive-branch at
rates termed confiscatory-rates far exceeding that of any other
government entity. 317 But nothing requires Congress to fund the
courts sufficiently to pay the rent, or the light bill or phone bill, 318 or
the salaries of the people who investigate crimes, or supervise felons,
or defend indigents, or, more importantly in civil cases, pay the
people who process the papers or electronic documents that are the
all-important record of adjudication on original jurisdiction. 319 If the
Constitution lacks this protection, then the judicial branch is left with
only the voting public to protect it. Life-tenured judges and other
safeguards are meaningless if Congress can merely turn off the
lights. If Congress cannot eliminate lower federal courts while
insisting on the continuation of preemption and removal, how much
can Congress impair those courts while expanding their function and
compelling plaintiffs to litigate in federal court? Short of total
darkness, how dim must the lights be to trigger a breach?
B.

The Moment ofBreach

The Supreme Court has held that the right of court access
must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful ' 32° and that litigants
Congress has the power to limit federal jurisdictions to force proceedings to be
brought in state court).
316. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 (1993 & Supp.
2005) (preventing salary adjustment statute from reducing judicial compensation
protected by the Constitution).
317. See supra note 11 and accompanying text ("Even though the judiciary
receives only two-tenths of one percent of the federal budget, the courts must pay
more rent in total dollars than any department or agency in the federal government
318. See Chomey, supra note 25 (reporting that pretrial services officers were
using their own cell phones because the budget could not cover the bill).
319. JudicialBusiness-2004, supra note 61, at 1 ("The courts were forced
to slash six percent of their workforce in 2004"); see also JudicialBusiness-2004,
supra note 61, at 8 ("Courts already in a money crunch slashed 1,350 jobs in the
preceding months").
320. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); see also Ryland v. Shapiro,
708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that "[a] mere formal right of access to
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must be afforded "some real opportunity ' 321 to protect rights. What
is "adequate, effective, and meaningful"? Assume that federal courts
were operating at fifty percent efficiency. The Speedy Trial Act
prioritizes criminal cases and in many districts, all of the courts'
remaining time would be spent on the criminal docket. 322 Is fifty

percent operating strength the point of breach? It may be for civil
claimants. Remember that the judicial budgeting process must
distinguish between mandatory and discretionary costs. Mandatory
costs-judicial salaries and rent-presently consume fifty-nine
percent of the budget, and, in the current budgeting formula, will
The remaining
consume seventy-two percent in five years.
"discretionary" functions-the clerks' offices, probation officers,
technology costs, and so on-will suffer reductions even in the face
of modest budget increases that do not keep pace with the quicklyrising mandatory costs, the increased discretionary costs such as
salary and benefits increases, rising technology costs, and newlyimplemented security costs. Federal courts are currently operating at
less than capacity, and that capacity reduction will accelerate.
Some districts are contemplating four-day weeks, while
others are furloughing so many support personnel that the effect will
be partial closure. 323 Closing one day a week is a twenty percent
cutback in a district's functioning. Assuming that the time allocation
between civil and criminal is even (and in some districts criminal
cases take up more than half the courts' time), 324 a one-day-a-week
closure is a forty percent cutback in those courts' availability for
the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Courts have required that the access
be 'adequate, effective, and meaningful."') (quoting Bounds).
321. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930)).

322. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (prioritizing criminal
cases). In spite of their smaller filings numbers compared to civil cases, criminal
cases take up a significantly disproportionate time. See generally Cook, supra
note 82, at 1581 (noting that federal judges spend a disproportionate amount of
their time on criminal cases, "due to the increase in defendants, trials, motions,
hearings, and sentencings").
323. See supra notes 23, 29-30 and accompanying text (supporting the
general proposition that U.S. courts are facing a severe budget crisis and may be
forced to go to a shorter work week in order to remain operational).
324. See Cook, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing how
criminal cases consume a disproportionate amount of time compared to the
number of civil cases on the courts' docket).
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civil cases. Some will argue that partial closing might involve only
the closing of nonjudicial functions, allowing judges and their
immediate staffs to function throughout the traditional five-day
week. This assumes that the court needs no assistance from the
clerk's office or other personnel on those days. Marshalls and other
security personnel would of course have to be there, and the utilities
would have to function, resulting in less savings on the "closed"
days. That lesser savings would have to be made up, perhaps by
having the clerk's office closed325two days a week. This may well be
the case in less than five years.
With the criminal docket having priority over civil cases,
would due process permit us to assess the courts' aggregate
performance, civil and criminal, and ignore the growing backlog of
civil cases? If so, if civil cases can be forced from state court into
federal court with the knowledge that they will not be heard, then
there is no remedy for methodical defunding, and there is no right to
court access. If the budget impact is sufficient to make federal civil
filings greatly exceed case resolutions for an extended period, those
cases will not have an adequate, effective, and meaningful remedy.
Civil defendants would lose incentive in the all-important pretrial
phase. Discovery would be less compelling with courts unavailable
to hear the disputes, and those discovery disputes would in turn
increase without fear of sanction, or even orders to compel. The
prospect of litigation pressures settlement, which would abate as
cases sat idle. With lower-incentive defendants, a paradox would
occur with some plaintiffs, or at least their lawyers. To the extent
that dispute resolution shifted even more heavily from litigation to
mediation and other out-of-court procedures, some plaintiffs would
increasingly file frivolous cases without the fear of facing the burden
of even summary judgment, let alone trial, looking instead for an
opportunity to mediate a profit.
This is not to suggest that we need a Speedy Civil Trial Act.
Civil litigation has always been tedious and lengthy, and delays must
be endured. Rather, it is to suggest that if the elimination of lower
federal courts would abate their jurisdiction, then a significant partial
closing (where criminal trials would take up most judicial resources)
325. Marcia Coyle, Courts on the Edge of Financial Crisis, THE
LAW

JOURNAL,

id=1100136999310.

Nov.

12,

2004,

NATIONAL

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
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would necessarily have the same effect of making civil jurisdiction
constitutionally questionable.
If impaired federal courts do breach a duty that breach occurs
with more impact for litigants who would prefer state courts. The
current crisis demonstrates the reason why courts of general
jurisdiction-state district courts-are essential to democratic
society, not to mention society's freedoms. Federal courts have
never had a function of general jurisdiction, but are being given
something close to that role by Congress's increasing use of removal
jurisdiction and the preemption of state law remedies. These
expansions have prima facie constitutional validity, but to the extent
that Congress is advancing its tort reform agenda by stripping the
federal courts' operating budget and undermining the same civil
litigation it has pushed from state courts into federal courts, the due
process clause and the Tenth Amendment compel the conclusion that
Congressional power has been exceeded.
It is difficult to fashion an appropriate test for breach, at least
this breach involving economic data, in an academic format. The
test must be devised in an adversary setting based on both national
and local data and the injury to the parties. Two sufficient grounds
come to mind. First, if Congress is shown to have intentionally
impaired the federal forum to achieve policy goals (something
simple like tort reform, or complex like re-defining the judicial
function) 326 unrelated to budget concerns, its jurisdictional
expansions such as the minimal diversity statutes arguably breach
the court-access duty and are unconstitutional. This is an unlikely
result because courts may not ordinarily inquire into Congressional
motives and must instead rely on the legislative language and
record. 327
Second, without speculating about Congressional intent, if
essential judicial branch functions are undermined to the extent that
litigants no longer have an "adequate, effective and meaningful"
forum, the duty is breached. Breach would not be triggered by
simple docket backlog, particularly if the backlog is specific to some
districts and not others, or by short-term backlog primarily caused by
326. See supra notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text (regarding public
positions attributable to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist).
327. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries
into Congressional motives are a hazardous matter.").
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non-funding factors such as judicial vacancies. It would be triggered
where Congressional funding cutbacks have a substantial and
nationwide impact on court functions to the extent that the districts'
collective dockets are growing. Thus, the standard might be based
on a nationwide problem (although the problem would not have to be
acute in every district), based on systemic problems rather than a
series of locally-occurring problems, that were ongoing rather than
short-term, and that affect essential court functions. One possible
standard, then, is if the federal backlog reaches the point that over a
sustained time it is adding civil cases significantly faster than it
disposes of them, and does so systematically rather than in isolated
districts, it will be in breach. Congress's current funding approach
may reach that point soon.
One additional factor in determining the moment of breach
will be backlogs in various state courts, which are historically more
crowded than federal courts. Moreover, some state courts are facing
their own funding crises, although not with the dire predictions
accompanying the federal forecasts. 328 Some will argue that if state
and federal backlogs are similar, then neither can be deemed to have
breached a duty of court access. That argument, put in its best light,
is like saying that the standard of care is determined by prevailing
practices in the locale of the negligence. Put in its worst light, it is
the equivalent of saying that if two defendants are grossly negligent,
then neither is negligent. Under this view, if both state and federal
judiciaries are compromised to the extent that criminal trials largely
displace the courts' ability to deal with civil dockets, then both
systems will have been breached. In this event, where neither
system is providing any remotely meaningful access, plaintiffs with
claims litigable in state court ought to be able to choose where to
stand in line. Another possibility, however, is that federal court
access for civil cases will become much worse than state court
328. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 1 (noting earlier funding shortages for
state courts); Hazard, supra note 1 (same); G. Gregg Webb & Keith E.
Whittington, JudicialIndependence, the Power of the Purse, and Inherent Judicial
Powers, 87 JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 2004 at 12 (noting the power struggle between
see generally
heads of the state legislatures and state supreme courts);
Symposium, Justice in Jeopardy: The State Court Funding Crisis, 43 JUDGES'
JOURNAL 5-43 (American Bar Ass'n., 2004) (discussing methods taken by courts
to address budget problems); Symposium, The Co$t of Ju$tice: Funding State
Courts, 88 JUDICATURE 152, 155-71 (Jan.-Feb. 2005) (recommending strategies to
address budget problems).
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access-that Congressional underfunding and executive overbilling
for rent, combined with Congress's expansion of federal jurisdiction
(both criminal and civil), and the priority for criminal cases, may
push the federal backlog well beyond the waiting time in the states.
C.

The Remedy for Congress'sFundingBreach

Two remedies have been suggested for underfunded courts.
One is the inherent power doctrine that courts-state or federalhave an inherent power to raise revenue. 329 The second is that courts
have the power to compel Congress to pay, or even that a single
federal district court can send Congress the bill.33 ° While those
arguments are not examined here, both are constitutionally doubtful
in regard to federal courts. A more plausible remedy is the one
argued for throughout this article-that Congress's regulatory power
over the lower federal courts is tied, at least loosely, to its funding.
Because of the forum-furnishing duty, an enabling budget is just as
important as an enabling statute. If either fails, Congress's judicial
regulation must fail with it. If Congress used its Article III
discretion to eliminate lower federal courts entirely, then the
Congress's jurisdictional regulation of those courts would be
dormant. To argue otherwise would be to argue that Congress could
authorize defendants to remove cases from state court for litigation
in a nonexistent court, or require plaintiffs with employee benefit
claims to file them in nonexistent federal courts. In every instance,
this would violate due process and the first amendment petition
clause, and in other instances would violate other clauses as
explained in this article. Without this constitutional solution, a
solution that necessarily follows from the cases discussed here, the
judiciary is at the mercy of Congress and the President.
Congress's current attitude toward federal courts-stripping
funds while piling on new cases-will breach Congress's duty at
some point. In more than two centuries of democracy that included a
329. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1287-91 (providing sources for the doctrine
and doubting the doctrine's validity); see also, Webb & Whittington, supra note
328, at 12 (endorsing the doctrine and describing recent examples such as the 2002
revenue-raising order from the Kansas Supreme Court).
330. See Bunge, supra note 1, at 272 ("[F]ederal courts should remedy these
constitutional violations by empanelling civil juries and sending the bill to
Congress.").
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civil war, a court-blocking crisis has never occurred on the level that
could occur in this fact setting. If Congress pursues the paradox of
increased jurisdiction with fewer personnel and less equipment,
courts will not be able to fix the problem by raising their own funds
or ordering Congress to pay. However, courts can determine that
they lack jurisdiction, based on Congress's failure to provide an
adequate, effective and meaningful forum.
What jurisdiction is lost? One answer is that, like Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "Wonderful One-Hoss Shay," the whole system
breaks down at once and all jurisdiction is impaired at the point of
breach, when a sufficient number of courts cease functioning as
traditional fully-operational courts. That answer is as severe as
Congress's attitude toward the judiciary. A more reasoned answer is
that because part of the problem is the Congress's astonishing
expansion of federal judicial jurisdiction, that the more recent and
exorbitant exercises of that jurisdiction fail.
But compromise answers may be inappropriate for
jurisdictional questions. The right of court access compels a third
answer for a specific class of plaintiffs-those who prefer to litigate
in state courts. If federal courts cannot function with the growing
docket and shrinking budget that Congress has given them, then
plaintiffs who have claims capable of adjudication in state courts
have a right to choose state court over federal court. Congress's
efforts to deny that choice and force those plaintiffs into partiallyfunctioning federal courts is a further breach.
Any statute
compelling this result is unconstitutional, violating due process and
the other court-access guarantees discussed here.
Specifically,
Congress loses the power to preempt state law remedies and compel
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts; it loses the power to
authorize the removal of claims from state to federal court; 3 3 1 and it
loses the power to authorize putative defendants to sue for
declarations of nonliability regarding claims for which true plaintiffs
prefer state court. Marbury's holding that a right entails a remedy
331. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, the Supreme Court held
that docket backlog was inappropriate grounds for remanding a removed case. 423
U.S. 336, 351-52 (1976). The proposition that court underfunding at some point
renders removal jurisdiction unconstitutional does not violate Thermtron, which
held that Congress did not intend docket backlog as grounds for denying removal.
Id. at 351. Congress's intent in authorizing and regulating removal jurisdiction
becomes irrelevant if their underlying action violates due process.
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has been eroded by Congress's creation of public rights that lack a
private remedy.332 Marbury and its progeny have not been eroded,
however, for the concept that courts of general jurisdiction have the
power and the duty to adjudicate legal claims that do have a private
remedy. Congress may not federalize those claims by exclusive
preemption or removal and then close the federal courthouse doors.

332. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (commenting on a case
where Congress created a right to accurate labeling of pharmaceutical drugs but
withheld a private remedy in preference for enforcement by government agencies).

